Central Asia’s subtle break from Moscow Toppling Lenin, not Russia

In a vivid reflection of the shifting power dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia, The Economist explores how Central Asia is carefully renegotiating its relationship with Russia—quietly asserting national sovereignty while avoiding direct confrontation. The recent removal of a towering Lenin statue from a central square in Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest city, becomes the article’s central symbol: the dismantling of imperial legacy, without yet dismantling the relationship itself.

Kyrgyz authorities claimed aesthetic motives for relocating Lenin, but the act was politically charged. While Moscow remained diplomatically silent, Russian pundits reacted with indignation, interpreting the move as another crack in what remains of Moscow’s symbolic hegemony in Central Asia. A Russian MP bluntly framed the incident within the context of Ukraine, calling it part of a broader “battle over the Soviet legacy.” That comment laid bare a deep insecurity: Moscow sees the dismantling of Soviet iconography across Central Asia not just as historical revisionism but as political defiance.

This unease is further exacerbated by Central Asia’s reaction to the Ukraine war. While none of the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have endorsed Russia’s invasion, none have outright condemned it either. Instead, they have adopted a neutral posture, much to Moscow’s frustration. This careful balancing act reveals their strategic intent: preserve ties with a powerful neighbour, while slowly peeling away from its shadow.

Indeed, the symbolism goes hand-in-hand with policy. The article notes that Kyrgyzstan’s arrest of a Russian cultural operative accused of recruiting mercenaries for the Ukraine war prompted anger in Moscow, including retaliatory suggestions to restrict migrant remittances. Given that Russia accounts for 93% of Kyrgyzstan’s $2.8 billion annual remittance inflow, such moves are not just rhetorical—they are coercive reminders of Moscow’s leverage.

But Central Asia is not simply reacting; it is also proactively exploring new partnerships. From the EU’s recent summit in Uzbekistan to the increasing courtship of China and Türkiye, Central Asian states are entertaining multipolar diplomacy in earnest. Such moves have not gone unnoticed in Moscow. When Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Tashkent shortly after the EU gathering, his tone betrayed concern. He rebuked the EU for allegedly promoting an anti-Russian agenda—criticism that Uzbek commentators met with defiance, reminding Lavrov that “we are not their colony!”

Yet, as The Economist points out, Russia remains deeply entrenched in the region’s economic and security infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s oil exports and internet flows depend overwhelmingly on Russian networks. Russian-built nuclear plants are on the horizon. Military alliances persist, and Russian bases remain active in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In this evolving dynamic, Central Asian states are neither breaking with Russia nor returning fully to its fold. Instead, they are recalibrating—symbolically toppling Soviet icons while maintaining the practical ties they still need. As The Economist concludes, Lenin may have been removed from Kyrgyz soil, but Russia’s presence in the region is far from over.

By Vugar Khalilov