China's global leadership ambitions falter as Trump prepares for return

According to a recent analysis by Bloomberg, as Donald Trump prepares for a potential return to power, the question of China's role on the global stage continues to loom large. 

When Donald Trump last assumed power in the US, many speculated that China might step into the leadership void created by his "America First" approach. In the end, China did not — and there is even less reason to believe it could succeed this time around. 

Even if Trump’s unilateralist policies estrange allies and diminish US prestige globally, as seems almost certain, China still lacks the credibility to position itself as a reasonable and convincing alternative. In fact, it has built a long and disappointing history of overpromising and underdelivering.

For example, three days before Trump’s first inauguration in January 2017, Xi delivered an impassioned speech defending globalisation at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Even some US allies hoped that China would maintain momentum in supporting multilateral efforts on climate change, free trade, public health, and other global challenges. 

Instead, China has continued to resist calls to set more ambitious climate goals or contribute mandatory financial aid to developing nations, despite its own significant progress in clean technologies. 

On trade, China did play a role in pushing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) through in 2020, a deal involving 15 Asian countries. It also sought to join the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership after Trump pulled the US out of the pact. 

However, when Trump launched his trade war against China in early 2018, the most logical response from Beijing would have been to strengthen relations with other trade partners. Yet, while the ink on RCEP was barely dry, China imposed sanctions on Australia, a fellow signatory, in retaliation for demanding an investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since then, trade tensions between China and the European Union have escalated to unprecedented levels.

On security, China's overall relationship with the West—excluding the US—is much worse today than it was eight years ago, largely due to its "wolf warrior" diplomacy and its support for Russia's Vladimir Putin. Rather than leveraging its influence to resolve global conflicts, Beijing provided an economic lifeline to Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. China has remained passive while wars have raged in the Middle East and Houthi rebels have disrupted global shipping. In East Asia, its gray-zone tactics have intensified tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

If China were to launch a new charm offensive now, European nations, Japan, Australia, and South Korea would likely remain suspicious and cautious, fearful of angering Trump. They would likely respond diplomatically, but act with restraint. Xi likely understands this reality and will be hesitant to invest significant time or resources in an initiative that seems destined to yield little.

Adding to his reluctance is a factor China didn't face during Trump's first term—a substantial resource deficit. Between 2017 and 2019, China's economy grew at an average rate of 6.6 per cent per year. Today, however, the economy is in a prolonged slump, forcing Beijing to scale back its ambitious Belt-and-Road Initiative. As China braces for more confrontations with the US, it is unlikely to allocate significant resources to anything other than its top priority: economic securitisation.

By Naila Huseynova