EU capitals seek workaround to sidestep Orbán’s Russia sanctions veto

A number of European Union governments are pursuing a new approach to prevent Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán from blocking sanctions against Russia — by enacting them at the national level, thereby removing the need for EU-wide consensus.

At least six EU capitals are backing a coordinated effort to transpose Brussels-led sanctions into their domestic legislation, according to six diplomats familiar with the talks, Caliber.Az reports per foreign media.

This would effectively limit Hungary’s ability to wield its veto power, which is currently required every six months to renew the bloc’s restrictive measures against Moscow.

“We all — member states and institutions — need to be in the mindset where we know it’s possible sanctions won’t be renewed,” said one diplomat, speaking anonymously due to the sensitive nature of the discussions. “We have to make sure the whole sanctions regime is resilient.”

Even countries that have previously been hesitant to act outside the EU framework — including Belgium and the Czech Republic — are now exploring the idea. While not all member states are expected to participate, support from key nations could reduce the potential impact of any future Hungarian obstruction.

To date, only a few countries on the EU’s eastern flank have introduced unilateral sanctions, but more governments are reportedly considering similar action.

Orbán has long used his veto threats to gain leverage over unrelated EU matters, and has pledged to block restrictions targeting Russian oil, gas and nuclear technology. He has done so despite repeated warnings from allies that any move to resume Russian energy imports would be gravely misguided.

In January, Hungary came close to derailing the renewal of sanctions entirely, with its delegation holding out until the final hours — a delay that nearly allowed billions of euros to flow back to Russia. According to sources, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio privately urged Budapest to relent, and the sanctions were eventually extended.

On April 14, EU foreign ministers convened in Brussels to prepare the 17th package of sanctions against Moscow, marking the latest response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Hungary’s refusal to endorse previous summit conclusions on Russia’s war in Ukraine reignited debate over how to address Budapest’s continued defiance of EU foreign policy. “Yes: If our usual suspect [Hungary] is creating a huge problem, then there will be ways to go around that,” said a third EU diplomat. “I can say that if the certain member state were to do this [try to block the sanctions rollover] that would be a very serious situation.”

Germany’s incoming coalition government is also pressing for stronger measures against member states that flout EU values, including potentially stripping voting rights — a move widely interpreted as being directed at Hungary. However, there is little agreement among capitals on how such a measure could be implemented.

While some EU diplomats believe shifting key decisions from Brussels to national governments may be a more pragmatic solution, others warn it could undermine unity at a time when Europe’s stance on Russia is already being tested — particularly with U.S. President Donald Trump openly pursuing a rapprochement with the Kremlin.

A fourth diplomat confirmed that legal groundwork is being laid to bypass Budapest’s veto, though noted that not all EU countries currently have mechanisms to implement sanctions independently. Such a fragmented approach, they cautioned, would be weaker than the existing bloc-wide framework.

Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský appeared to play down the likelihood of removing the unanimity requirement in foreign policy. “If you don’t have a power of veto in your core interests — it’s not only about Hungary, it’s many other states that have core interests — I think Europe could very easily be much weaker,” he said.

Lipavský suggested the ongoing standoffs with Orbán had shifted focus toward forming a “coalition of the willing” — an informal alliance of countries backing Ukraine politically and militarily. “This can be perceived as a failure of common foreign policy inside the EU institutions,” he added, “but we really should be focusing on finding a political solution.”

“Orbán chose isolation and a path of ‘illiberal democracy’ against the obvious interest of the EU and, in fact, [of] Hungary,” said a fifth diplomat. “He was given many opportunities, and rejected extended hands. The security of Europe is too serious an issue to negotiate with one person who sees things 180 degrees differently than everyone else.”

Lithuanian official Kęstutis Budrys echoed this sentiment in an earlier interview, suggesting that national measures could help stem the flow of Russian money and goods should EU sanctions falter. “Not many countries have national legislation with national restrictive measures.

In Lithuania we do, but we need clarity on the legal side — whether we can expand those to sectoral sanctions,” Budrys said. “But then we will have the question of what is the EU for then?”

By Aghakazim Guliyev