ISW: How coup attempt in Russia took place, why Prigozhin made a deal

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have analysed the actions of the Wagnerites and their leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, who organised a rebellion but would not have been able to fight in Moscow "without additional support".

The review noted that Russian sources suggest that an agreement was reached through the mediation of Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko to end the armed rebellion by the Wagner Group on 23-24 June, including the possible involvement of the head of the Russian president’s administration.

Meduza, a Latvia-based Russian independent news outlet, citing sources in the Kremlin, has reported that Prigozhin initially tried to contact the Russian presidential administration at noon on 24 June, when the Wagner militants were moving north from Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow, but Putin refused to speak to Prigozhin.

Meduza noted that after Prigozhin saw the lack of broad military support for Wagner's actions and changed his mind about the PMC's prospects, the Kremlin resorted to negotiations with Lukashenko, Russian Presidential Chief of Staff Anton Vaino and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov.

The analysts stated that the consequences of the Wagner armed uprising are not fully known, including whether the agreement will be implemented, whether all parties involved will fully comply with it, what the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defence intend to do with Wagner personnel, and whether Wagner fighters will cooperate despite Prigozhin's wishes.

In their opinion, the implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence also remain ambiguous.

The report also pointed out that some Russian sources suggest that Alexey Dyumin, the current governor of Tula Oblast and a former Putin bodyguard, could replace Shoigu as defence minister, although ISW cannot confirm these speculations.

"Any changes to the MoD leadership would notably represent a significant victory for Prigozhin, who justified his armed rebellion by directly accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine," ISW said.

Experts have also pointed out that new details about the composition of the Wagner units that approached Moscow on 24 June indicate that Prigozhin would most likely not have been able to conduct active hostilities in Moscow without additional support. Presumably, this is why Prigozhin became more inclined to make a deal with Lukashenko.

Furthermore, the report notes that the ability of Russian troops to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been significantly affected by the Wagner rebellion.

However, some Russian sources have used the armed mutiny as a way to justify Russian failures amid the success of the Ukrainian Defence Forces on 24 and 25 June.

Key takeways

Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin’s chief of staff.

The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.

Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.

Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.

The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front.

Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s 23-24 June armed rebellion.

Ukrainian Defence Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on 23 June that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivka Bridge in Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.

Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponise policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas.