ISW: Ineffective sanctions let Russia acquire components for combat UAVs

Failures of Western sanctions efforts against the provision of arms components to Iran have likely contributed to Russia’s ability to bypass Western sanctions to acquire components for combat drones through military cooperation with Iran.

US officials stated on February 5 that Russia and Iran are moving ahead with plans to build an Iranian drone factory on Russian soil, the second such international Iranian drone factory, Caliber.Az reports, citing the Institute for the Study of War [ISW].

Iran opened a drone production factory in Tajikistan - a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) member state and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) candidate - in May 2022. Russia may leverage its significant economic ties to Tajikistan through the CSTO and EAEU to launder drone components or procure manufactured drones for use in Ukraine to bypass international sanctions, the ISW analysts report.

UK investigative group Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported in November 2022 that 82 per cent of Iranian Shahed-131, Shahed 136, and Mohajer-6 drones downed in Ukraine had chips, semiconductors, and other components that came from the US despite high import and export control restrictions on such components to Iran.

Most Western-manufactured components in the downed Iranian drones were produced between 2020 and 2021, following the expiration of United Nations Security Council heavy arms sanctions against Iran in 2020. Most Western companies whose components were found in downed Iranian drones in Ukraine denied directly selling components to Russia, Iran, or Belarus since the start of the war.

However, the representative of a Swiss manufacturing company noted that it is impossible to be completely sure that distributors of arms components do not sell components to sanctioned entities, implying that Russia, Iran, or other sanctioned states can exploit loopholes allowing them to acquire Western-produced arms components via proxy actors.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian officials assess that Russian forces are preparing to launch a large-scale decisive offensive in eastern Ukraine in mid-to-late February.

Select Russian nationalist voices continued to express scepticism toward Russia’s ability to launch a successful offensive past late February.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s false narrative that the provision of German tanks to Ukraine threatens Russian security.

Kremlin-appointed Russian and occupation officials continue to implement social benefit schemes that target children and teenagers in occupied areas of Ukraine to consolidate social control and integration of these territories into Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through legislative manipulations.

The Kremlin continues to deny Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin legitimacy and authority in Russia.

Prigozhin’s appeal in the Russian nationalist information space may also be declining as he continues to overcompensate for the culmination of Wagner’s attack around Bakhmut.

Failures of Western sanctions efforts against the provision of arms components to Iran have likely contributed to Russia’s ability to bypass Western sanctions to acquire combat drones through military cooperation with Iran.

Russian forces likely made tactical gains northeast of Kupyansk between February 4 and February 6, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of previous positions on the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 5 and February 6.

Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast as of February 6 despite Russian claims that Russian forces captured Bilohorivka on February 3.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut but still have not encircled the settlement as of February 6.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.

Ukrainian forces continued limited attempts to cross the Dnipro River.

Russian conventional and irregular forces may be increasingly struggling to recruit from Russian penal colonies due to high casualties among prior penal colony recruits.

Russian forces continue to struggle with ethnic tensions and tensions between irregular forces.

Russian officials and occupation authorities may be intensifying operational security to conceal new Russian force deployments in Donbas.