Physics vs. lyricism: Russia-China relations in a time of Western pressure Is the alliance good or bad for Europe?

Relations between Moscow and Beijing are developing smoothly, with their main interests ("physics") taking priority and pushing aside secondary issues ("lyrics").

On May 16-17, Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to China. As a visit of this level - the highest in the protocol hierarchy of communication between heads of state - is expected, he was accompanied by a huge government delegation, and the ceremony was as solemn as possible. Another significance was emphasised throughout: this was the first foreign visit by a Russian president since he took the inaugural oath of office as head of state for the fifth time on May 7.

They always try to use the symbolism of the first visit to signal to the "city and the world" about the foreign policy priorities of the upcoming presidential term. Thus, in 2000, Putin's first trip was to Belarus, in 2004 - to Ukraine, in 2012 - again to Belarus, and in 2018 - to Austria. As can be seen even from this list, one should not overestimate the strategic significance of such symbolism, as diplomatic priorities and plans can change depending on current events. However, it is obvious that Moscow has the most serious and ambitious plans for its relations with Beijing. And this is mutual, as the objective needs of both states in the existing international conditions push them towards such a perception of each other.

This is well reflected in the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on deepening relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation entering a new era in the context of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which was adopted at the end of the negotiations. Borrowing images from Boris Slutsky's famous poem, we can say that this statement and Russian-Chinese cooperation in general today can be used to write treatises on the correlation between physics and lyrics in international politics.

A lyric about achievement

Lyricism in and around Moscow-Beijing relations is ubiquitous. It manifests itself in the philosophically multifaceted formulations of Chinese diplomacy, in the bright pathos of Russian state rhetoric, and in the endless stream of publicistic assessments of the prospects of these relations by all sorts of Western experts and politicians.

The above-mentioned joint statement is full of lyricism, which, as is becoming traditional for Russia and China, is so voluminous that it resembles a joint statement at a scientific conference. This time it took almost 7,000 words to speak on all the topics of mutual importance to the parties. By comparison, a similar joint statement adopted in early February 2022, which then gained historical fame after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, was about 40 per cent shorter. At that time, Moscow and Beijing proclaimed that "friendship between the two states has no borders, there are no forbidden zones in cooperation, the strengthening of bilateral strategic interaction is not directed against third countries, and is not influenced by the changing international environment and situational changes in third countries". Two years later, the leaders of the countries confirmed and developed these theses.

In the new joint statement, as well as in comments to the press, the main emphasis was placed on the special model of relations between China and Russia, which is ideally suited to the international realities of the 21st century. According to Xi Jinping, it is "an example of building a new type of interstate relations and relations between major neighbours". In his opinion, the achievement is due to the partners' commitment to five principles:

• Mutually respectfully and firmly support each other on the fundamental interests of both sides.
• Continue to shape the architecture of bilateral co-operation on the basis of comprehensive mutual benefit.
• Strengthen the centuries-old friendship and "pass the torch of this friendship from generation to generation".
• Strategically promote the UN-centred diversity of global development and governance.
• Promote political settlement of conflicts "for truth and justice" and oppose the Cold War mentality as well as unilateral hegemony and bloc confrontation.

Vladimir Putin made similar assessments. He emphasised that relations between Moscow and Beijing "are not opportunistic and are not directed against anyone". He also repeated another thesis that cooperation between Russia and China in world affairs "today is one of the main stabilising factors in the international arena".

For all their heightened lyricism, these words cannot be called completely detached from reality, at least from the point of view of the dynamics of bilateral relations in various spheres. It is enough to look at the indicators of Russian-Chinese trade turnover over the past year. According to Beijing's data, the volume of mutual trade exceeded 240 billion US dollars and increased almost 2.7 times compared to the figures of a decade ago. The Russian side particularly notes the notable growth of its own food exports to China: they have increased by more than one and a half times, and the entire bilateral trade turnover of agricultural products has increased by 40 per cent. Deliveries of Russian energy products are also on the rise. Industrial products, of course, in growing quantities go mainly in the opposite direction and noticeably replenish the export profits of Chinese manufacturers.

In general, there is a structural and therefore long-term restructuring of the entire complex of economic, military-political, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, where China's role for Russia is becoming central. This is especially evident against the backdrop of increasing sanctions pressure from the West.

A lyric about problems

Vladimir Putin's visit, like the whole process of Russian-Chinese rapprochement in recent years, is widely accompanied by lyrics of a different kind - about the deep contradictions between Moscow and Beijing and the impossibility of overcoming them, even if one wanted to. Such lyrics are heard from some experts in both Russia and China, but they are reproduced particularly often and concentrated by Western commentators. When analysing the dynamics and prospects of relations between the two countries, they mainly focus on the problems, stressing that many of them are caused by objective geopolitical, economic and historical realities. For example, the fact that if the current pace and nature of cooperation continue, Russia will irrevocably become China's "little brother" and lose the scope for autonomous manoeuvre in its foreign policy.

On this basis, many analysts conclude that the Russian-Chinese "friendship without borders" will simply not stand the test of time. Moscow will still have to find a counterbalance to China in the near future, which can only be the West. Accordingly, this logic leads to another conclusion: the United States and its allies should not worry about the increasing rapprochement between the two main geopolitical rivals. Moreover, it is necessary to increase the degree of simultaneous pressure on Russia and China even more, as this will eventually lead to a weakening of the positions of both. And the Kremlin will still have to look for ways to restore relations with the West, which will eventually lead to unilateral concessions by the Russian government.

For all the subtlety of such lyricism and the crudeness of the analytical conclusions resulting from it, it cannot be said that it is completely devoid of grounds. It is obvious that one of the important factors in the success of Sino-Russian relations in recent decades has been the fact that the strategic aspirations of Beijing and Moscow have been concentrated in different directions. For China, the main theatre of geopolitical interests is, for obvious reasons, the Asia-Pacific region. And for Russia it has traditionally been Europe, even if the main mass of Russian territory is located east of the Urals. In other words, with such strategic multidirectionality, Moscow and Beijing were and are getting closer as if "back to back": with a large volume of common interests, their gazes and priority interests were directed to different geographical spaces. This largely ensured the complementarity of interests and the absence of insurmountable contradictions.

Whether this structure of complementary interests can be preserved if Russia's "pivot to the East" continues in the same vein, i.e. implying an almost total reorientation of Moscow from the European direction, is indeed a big theoretical question. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the expert discussion in the West and in some Russian circles it drowns out many other questions.

Physics beats lyrics

But this question itself, as well as the rest of the lyrics, is drowned out by physics. By analogy with natural nature, the laws of physics often describe the basic regularities of what is happening in the world of politics, separating the main from the secondary. As Boris Slutsky wrote, "It is a matter of world law...". In this sense, cooperation between Russia and China can serve as a kind of textbook for students of international relations. Few other bilateral relations so clearly demonstrate which factors and with what priority predetermine foreign policy decisions.

The physics of Russian-Chinese relations is simple. If the US and its allies view Moscow and Beijing as two major strategic adversaries and, most importantly, build a policy of containment of both in a straightforward and nuanced manner, Russia and China can have only one natural reaction. Any pressure gives birth to reciprocal pressure (albeit not always symmetrical), any force stimulates reciprocal force (albeit not always instantaneously). According to this basic logic of nature, if Western policy is aimed at limiting Moscow's and Beijing's capabilities and potentials, and in doing so, instead of subtle diplomatic adjustments, simply aims at widespread pressure, it can only provoke active counteraction. And since Russia and China perceive Western pressure as an existential challenge with no compromise solutions, their response can only be uncompromising. For all the asymmetric possibilities and secondary risks to their own development. For all the underlying contradictions and problems in their own bilateral relations. And for all the arguments or value appeals that can be heard from Western politicians or anyone else.

In the first step, the Russian-Chinese response to systemic Western pressure requires maximum convergence and close cooperation. This is exactly what we are witnessing. The process is, of course, non-linear. Further events and, most importantly, the actions and decisions of the West, may make significant adjustments to it. But for now, in response to the line of dual containment of Moscow and Beijing dominating in US political circles, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expectedly proposed the formula "double counteraction versus double containment". As a result of Vladimir Putin's visit to China, we can state that this formula has been documented and unambiguously confirmed for all those who, carried away by lyrics, forget about physics in international relations.

The views and opinions expressed by guest columnists in their op-eds may differ from and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial staff.