Russian drones over Poland: Wake-up call for NATO’s costly defence strategy

Poland's recent interception and destruction of several Russian drones that crossed into its airspace on September 10, 2025, serves as a stark reminder of the increasing vulnerability of European defences to low-cost, high-frequency drone incursions. 

The event, which occurred during a period of heightened Russian military activity in Ukraine, underscored the new challenges NATO faces in defending its territory against unmanned aerial threats that can be as difficult to neutralise as they are inexpensive to produce, an article by Army Recognition points out. 

The intercepted drones, similar to Russia's Geran series, closely related to the Iranian Shahed family, are part of a broader strategy that seeks to impose significant operational costs on defenders. These drones, though individually relatively harmless, can overwhelm defence systems when used in large numbers, complicating efforts to protect critical infrastructure and resources.

Threat of low-cost, attritable drones

The drones used by Russia in its latest assault on Polish airspace are designed to be simple, inexpensive, and disposable. Their airframes typically measure around two and a half meters in wingspan and carry a modest warhead weighing between 40 and 50 kilograms.

Powered by a small piston engine, they fly at low altitudes and rely on inertial and satellite navigation systems, often with assistance from Russia's GLONASS. The drones are cheap to produce — often costing only tens of thousands of dollars each — and are launched using basic systems, such as a small booster or a rail launcher.

However, it is the sheer volume of these drones that poses the greatest risk. Though each individual drone might not seem particularly threatening, when launched in large numbers, they can saturate defence systems, overwhelm radar, and stretch air defence resources. It is this “cost imposition” strategy that aims to exhaust defenders’ resources by forcing expensive, complex responses to relatively low-cost threats.

Poland’s response: High-cost, high-efficiency defence

When the drones crossed into Polish airspace, NATO’s response was swift and methodical. Polish F-16 fighter jets were scrambled, and NATO allies quickly deployed F-35s to assist with patrols. Italian airborne early warning aircraft extended the radar coverage, while Germany’s Patriot missile defense systems were put on high alert. Tankers were mobilised to ensure fighter jets could stay airborne longer, and airspace was restricted near the border to prevent further intrusions.

This layered defence, a hallmark of NATO’s strategy, ultimately proved successful in neutralising the drones.

However, as the Army Recognition article notes, the costs associated with such a response are significant. While the drones themselves are cheap, the missiles fired from fighters, the operational costs of keeping aircraft in the air, and the maintenance of a high-alert defense posture quickly add up. A single missile fired from an F-16 or F-35, along with the associated fuel, crew time, and operational expenses, can easily cost tens of thousands of dollars—far more than the drones themselves.

This asymmetry between the cost of drones and the cost of defending against them is at the heart of modern military challenges. The Russian drone incursions are a textbook example of how inexpensive, attritable threats can impose financial and operational strain on defending nations. For NATO, the dilemma is clear: how to defend against these drones without incurring excessive costs or diverting valuable resources from more serious threats.

The article suggests that the solution lies in tiering responses to threats. High-end interceptors and air-to-air missiles should be reserved for more significant and immediate threats, while smaller, less expensive countermeasures—such as anti-drone guns, point-defense systems, and electronic warfare tools—could be used to neutralize smaller, less critical drones. Interceptor drones and helicopters could also offer a cost-effective solution, particularly in difficult terrain or near populated areas.

Moreover, integrating more advanced sensors and radar systems, optimized specifically for small unmanned aerial systems, could help defenders more effectively identify and engage drone threats without overwhelming their systems. A robust command and control network, able to fuse data from various sources in real time, would be essential for efficient defense.

European wake-up call

Poland's interception of the Russian drones represents both a success and a warning. While the NATO response worked effectively in the short term, the ongoing cost of such operations is unsustainable in the long run. The article from Army Recognition highlights the growing need for NATO countries to develop more affordable, scalable, and flexible defense solutions against small UAS threats.

As Russia continues to deploy low-cost, high-frequency drone attacks, NATO will need to prioritise investment in defence systems that can neutralize such threats without bankrupting national defense budgets. Enhanced electronic warfare capabilities, more cost-effective point-defence systems, and rapid-response interceptor drones could all play crucial roles in ensuring Europe is not continually outpaced by the evolving nature of aerial threats.

While Poland’s September 2025 encounter with Russian drones was successfully contained, the lesson is clear: the cost of defending against small, attritable drones must be addressed if NATO is to maintain both its deterrence and resilience in the face of this evolving threat.

By Sabina Mammadli