Syria’s “elections”: A step toward democracy or a carefully managed facade? Analysis based on reporting from Foreign Policy

When Adham Masoud al-Qaq returned to Syria after 36 years in exile, it seemed symbolic of a nation finally shaking off decades of authoritarian rule. A Druze academic and longtime dissident, Qaq had opposed both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, enduring repeated arrests before fleeing to Egypt. His triumphant homecoming in December 2024 coincided with the fall of the Assad regime, raising hopes for a new era of democratic governance. Yet Syria’s first parliamentary elections under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, held on October 5, 2025, illustrate just how complicated that transition remains.

Foreign Policy’s reporting paints a picture of a political system that is cautiously opening yet tightly controlled. Under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s parliament functioned primarily as a symbolic rubber stamp, lacking real authority to check executive power. While Sharaa’s constitutional declaration in March 2025 nominally grants the assembly legislative powers, these are limited to bills initiated by the executive, with no capacity for votes of no-confidence or immediate presidential elections. Critics like Radwan Ziadeh argue that the process can hardly be called an election; it is more the “formation of Syrian legislative power” than a genuine exercise in popular sovereignty.

The electoral system itself underscores these constraints. Only a few thousand delegates—6,000 in total—participated in a tiered electoral college system to fill 119 of 210 parliamentary seats. Subcommittees, appointed by the president through a cascading hierarchy, selected the final candidates, leaving much of the process opaque. Though officials touted representation targets for women, minorities, and technocrats, results fell far short: only six women and ten minority candidates won seats, while Sunni men from elite administrative and business circles dominated.

Yet amid these structural limitations, Foreign Policy observed genuine signs of civic engagement and debate. Candidates like Qaq and Mouyad Zaidan, despite failing to secure seats, took their campaigns seriously, emphasizing statecraft, reconstruction, and the economy. In Damascus suburbs devastated by years of civil war, discussions on rebuilding, governance, and civil liberties revealed a population cautiously testing the waters of political participation. Even a woman candidate in Homs, Maysoun Shams al-Din, highlighted the potential for merit-based representation in a system historically skewed by patronage and fear.

Nevertheless, the elections’ managed nature was apparent. Local residents often remained unaware of voting dates; subcommittees exercised significant discretion, and some constituencies postponed elections indefinitely due to “security concerns.” Qaq himself noted that outcomes often seemed predetermined, with political allegiances effectively signalling winners before votes were cast. Moreover, remnants of the Assad era, as Zaidan noted, continue to influence society through corruption and intimidation, hinting at the enduring shadow of the old regime.

In sum, Syria’s October 2025 parliamentary elections are less a revolution in governance than a carefully orchestrated experiment in participatory politics. While they allow dissenters and professionals to engage in the political process, structural controls, executive dominance, and limited public awareness temper the prospects for meaningful change. The elections reveal both a cautious aspiration for democracy and the lingering weight of authoritarian traditions, making Syria’s political evolution a delicate, uncertain journey.

By Vugar Khalilov