Aselsan equips Bayraktar Akıncı drones with electronic support, attack modules VIDEO
New Aselsan electronic support and attack modules have been integrated into Bayraktar Akıncı drones, enabling them to seek radio emitters, jam signals and carry out deception missions.
Aselsan and Baykar announced on X that ANTIDOT 2-U/ES and 2-U/EA containers were deployed on the Akıncı during recent exercises, marking a shift toward unmanned air-defence and stand-off electronic-warfare capabilities, Caliber.Az reports.
Elektronik harbin gökyüzündeki milli güçleri⬇️
— ASELSAN (@aselsan) October 24, 2025
✔️ANTIDOT 2-U/EA Elektronik Taarruz Podu
✔️ANTIDOT 2-U/ES Elektronik Destek Podu
🇹🇷Görev başarıyla tamamlandı.#BAYKAR🤝#ASELSAN https://t.co/pyaxa6QGtR
The upgrade lets the high-altitude, long-endurance strike UAV move beyond pure reconnaissance and strike roles to locate sources of radio emission, impose electronic interference and feed false targeting data, reducing reliance on scarce manned EW aircraft and altering strike package planning.
The configuration centres on Aselsan’s ANTIDOT suites: the ANTIDOT 2-U/S electronic-support (ESM) module and the ANTIDOT 2-U/EA electronic-attack (EA) module.
The ESM module detects, classifies, logs and precisely geolocates hostile radar emissions and streams real-time telemetry to a ground control station.
The EA module provides powerful jamming and spoofing techniques to degrade or deceive threat radars.
Together they form a single unmanned airborne node that can both map emitters and act against them, extending protection to accompanying aircraft or missiles in the same corridor — effectively closing the ISR-to-effect loop in one platform.
Technically, the two-module approach is simple and complementary: ANTIDOT 2-U/S builds the electromagnetic picture with angularly precise emitter fixes and forwards cues to the onboard electronic module or cooperating assets; ANTIDOT 2-U/EA applies noise, suppression and spoofing to disrupt detection, tracking and engagement chains.
Strategically, fielding ANTIDOT on Akıncı augments national EW capabilities by complementing ground systems such as KORAL and future airborne SOJ platforms, strengthening control over the full electronic-warfare chain.
The doctrine that places EW at the forefront and employs strike-capable carriers to carve out protected air corridors has moved from theory to practice and, crucially, is now being showcased openly rather than hinted at.
By Jeyhun Aghazada







