Can Iran’s hardline base sustain the regime amid growing dissent?

A recent article from Foreign Policy delves into the current crisis faced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, examining the gradual erosion of support from the once-fervent base that upheld the regime since the 1979 revolution. The shift in loyalty among the Iranian populace, including the hard base loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a significant development that threatens the survival of the regime.

Initially, the Islamic Republic enjoyed broad support across various sectors of society. Over the years, however, this support dwindled due to the regime’s hardline policies and mishandling of critical issues such as economic hardship and political repression. The core constituency—comprising the working class, rural population, and urban middle classes—has steadily abandoned the regime, with each demographic group facing distinct reasons for disillusionment. The middle class, for instance, was alienated by the regime’s ideological crackdown during the 1980s and the violent suppression of dissent in 2009, while the working class grew disillusioned due to economic mismanagement and corruption.

By 2019, the support base of the regime became concentrated within a small, ideologically committed segment known as the "hard base," which includes fervent followers of the IRGC and its associated political factions. This group supports the regime primarily due to its ideological stance, including policies on morality policing, the so-called "axis of resistance" abroad, and the goal of developing nuclear weapons. However, recent events, including the death of President Ebrahim Raisi and the appointment of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, have sparked significant dissent within this hard base. The base’s loyalty was further tested by the regime's failure to effectively confront Israel, domestic economic struggles, and an apparent willingness to negotiate with former U.S. President Donald Trump, who had orchestrated the assassination of Qassem Suleimani.

The article highlights the precarious position of the Islamic Republic’s leadership, led by Khamenei and the IRGC, in light of these cracks in the hard base. The erosion of this group’s support represents a potentially catastrophic loss for the regime, as it is the hard base that has historically functioned as the foot soldiers in the regime's efforts to suppress dissent. The loss of support from this segment could lead to a scenario similar to that of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, whose regime collapsed after the desertion of his own loyalist forces.

In response to these developments, Khamenei has attempted to revive ideological policies both domestically and abroad, aiming to reassert control over the hard base. However, these efforts come with significant risks. The intensification of hardline policies, such as the enforcement of morality codes, could provoke mass protests, further undermining the regime’s stability. The paradox for Khamenei is clear: If he softens his ideological stance, he risks alienating his loyalists; if he doubles down on these policies, he risks triggering wider unrest. Either way, the Islamic Republic faces an existential crisis.

By Vugar Khalilov