China’s quiet drift toward Cold War-era nuclear brinkmanship

In a recent Foreign Policy article, a chilling narrative unfolds: while publicly calling for nuclear restraint, China may be inching toward adopting one of the Cold War’s riskiest doctrines—launch under attack (LUA). The article warns that such a policy shift could destabilise not just East Asia, but global nuclear deterrence frameworks for decades to come. By dissecting China's evolving military posture and comparing it to U.S. and Soviet/Russian precedents, the article strikes a balance between technical detail and geopolitical insight, painting a picture of a nuclear power at a dangerous crossroads.

Traditionally, China has positioned itself as a cautious, minimalist nuclear actor. It maintains a no-first-use policy and has historically kept its warheads separated from delivery systems, reducing the likelihood of accidental or hasty use. But this posture appears to be shifting. The article highlights China’s construction of a comprehensive early warning system—including infrared satellites and over-the-horizon radar installations—mirroring infrastructure used by the U.S. and Russia to support LUA capabilities.

At its core, LUA enables a country to launch a nuclear retaliation within minutes of detecting an incoming strike, before enemy warheads land. Advocates argue it enhances deterrence by denying adversaries the possibility of a disarming first strike. But as the Foreign Policy piece points out, the risks far outweigh the benefits—particularly in today’s more complex strategic environment.

Unlike the binary superpower rivalry of the Cold War, today’s missile trajectories are harder to interpret due to advanced manoeuvrable technologies and ambiguous payloads. The article underscores that a U.S. missile headed toward Northeast Asia could just as easily be interpreted as targeting China, Russia, or North Korea. With seconds to decide and little room for error, China risks triggering a nuclear war over a misread signal or technical glitch.

Adding to the complexity is the strain LUA could place on civilian control. The article raises an important internal question: Would compressed decision-making timelines shift more authority to the People’s Liberation Army, potentially eroding the Chinese Communist Party’s tight grip over nuclear use? LUA demands decentralised preparedness, which may not sit well with Beijing’s command culture.

The article also considers the geopolitical ripple effects. If the United States perceives China moving toward LUA, it might further entrench its own LUA posture, fuelling a new arms race based on worst-case assumptions. Ironically, China’s efforts to secure itself could erode its security in the long run, heightening the risk of misunderstanding and escalation.

Still, the article offers a path forward. Even if Beijing opts for LUA, there are risk-mitigation measures it can adopt—like requiring dual-sensor confirmation of missile launches or waiting for nuclear detonation before retaliation. Furthermore, it argues that China doesn’t need to operationalise LUA to gain deterrent value. Simply creating ambiguity about its nuclear posture may be enough to keep adversaries cautious.

Ultimately, Foreign Policy delivers a compelling and urgent call for China to resist replicating Cold War errors. With great power comes great restraint—and if China wants to be seen as a responsible nuclear actor, it must not only build wisely, but choose wisely what not to build.

By Vugar Khalilov