Dirty bombs, dangerous illusions: Iran’s real nuclear gamble
Foreign Policy’s recent article explores a chilling possibility: Iran’s potential use of a dirty bomb amid its ongoing confrontation with Israel and the United States. Though speculation over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear intentions is nothing new, the piece adds urgency by highlighting the strategic, psychological, and geopolitical fallout of deploying a radiological dispersal device (RDD). Yet, as the analysis makes clear, a dirty bomb is more a tool of terror than a weapon of war—and far less useful to a state actor like Iran than it might first appear.
A key distinction the article makes is between a dirty bomb and a true nuclear weapon. While the latter creates devastation through nuclear fission, a dirty bomb combines conventional explosives with radioactive materials commonly used in medicine and industry—cesium-137, cobalt-60, and others. Its primary danger lies not in physical destruction but in panic, psychological trauma, and economic disruption.
Several experts quoted—including Marion Messmer of Chatham House and Pavel Podvig of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research—emphasise that the actual radiation from a dirty bomb would likely affect only a small area and cause few, if any, direct casualties. Its greatest power lies in fear and the political blowback it would trigger. As Podvig notes, such an act would bring “contamination and panic,” not mass death.
Politically, deploying a dirty bomb would be catastrophic for Iran. As King’s College London’s Andreas Krieg says, doing so would amount to “strategic suicide.” Even allies like Russia and China would find it difficult to support such an act, while Iran’s proxies and partners across the region could distance themselves. The reputational cost, coupled with the near-certain retaliatory military strike from the U.S. or Israel, makes the weapon unattractive. Iran, which positions itself as a sovereign actor fighting Western aggression, would risk being globally labelled as a state sponsor of nuclear terrorism.
The article also highlights internal political risks. Use of a dirty bomb could spark unrest within Iran by drawing renewed sanctions and threatening a return to open conflict. It would fracture Tehran’s regional posture and give rivals justification to escalate militarily. Far from deterring aggression, such a move could provoke it.
Importantly, the article suggests Iran sees limited strategic value in a dirty bomb, especially as it edges closer to real nuclear capability. With enriched uranium stockpiles already in hand—some reportedly at 60% purity—Tehran may be more focused on building a credible nuclear deterrent, as North Korea has done, rather than resorting to a weapon often associated with non-state actors.
Ultimately, Foreign Policy’s piece argues that while Iran can build a dirty bomb, it won’t—not unless backed into a corner. The dirty bomb, in this scenario, is less a threat than a talking point, one that distracts from the more serious long-term challenge: the potential for Iran to cross the nuclear threshold outright.
By Vugar Khalilov