How Russian-Ukrainian war reshapes Middle East arms market Analysis by Al Arabiya

According to an analysis by Al Arabiya, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the arms market in the Middle East, where many countries decided to manage by diversifying their arms suppliers while doubling down on efforts to build their own production capabilities with many new military relationships being forged.

This emerging dynamic is especially unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa, a region which is home to two of the largest importers of Russian weaponry (Algeria and Egypt), two of the fastest-growing global arms exporters (Israel and Türkiye), and Gulf countries investing large amounts of money and resources into developing domestic defence industrial bases (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said in a policy note.

Russian military-industrial complex is hit

These changes in weapons trade trends are due to the drop in Russian supply – which is likely greater than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. “Whether through battlefield loss, the cumulative effect of Western sanctions, or simply the reputational damage suffered by Russian platforms, Moscow will struggle in the coming years to maintain its status as a top global arms exporter,” wrote Goldberger Fellow Grant Rumley and Visiting Fellow Louis Dugit-Gros with the Washington Institute.

The Russian war on Ukraine ended up hurting Russia’s position as a leading global arms exporter through many factors, which include the Western sanctions which affect Russia’s ability to field and export arms in two distinct ways – by hampering the Russian defence industry’s ability to source necessary parts and through the application of sanctions against third-party countries that purchase weapons from Russia.

Furthermore, the battlefield demand and loss take its toll on Russian weapon stocks due to losses of Russian platforms in Ukraine and the subsequent need to replenish its own forces. Additionally, Russia took a reputational hit as Ukrainian forces have fielded Western platforms to surprising effect against their Russian adversaries, a similar reputational hit will likely follow for some Russian arms on the market. Analysis conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicate Russia has lost at least 9,700 pieces of military equipment, including tanks, artillery systems, and aircraft.

Rumley and Dugit-Gros highlighted that many countries reliant on imports took away a lesson from Russia’s invasion which that overreliance on a single military supplier is a potential vulnerability. The same argument can also be made for the US, as countries relying on it face long delivery times.

The solution to weapon-importing countries in the Middle East was to escape the predicament of overreliance on a single military supplier and developing their own defence industrial base.

“Once [the defence industrial base is] established, it can reduce the turbulence associated with acquiring arms in an era of great power competition, thus bolstering a country’s independence and sovereignty. [This is especially true] in the Middle East and North Africa, where countries are looking to build up their own defence industrial bases,” Rumley and Dugit-Gros argued.

A way of building from the ground up a country’s own defence industrial base is through co-production and research and development agreements with established suppliers.

Examples of such arrangements include: Türkiye has co-production agreements with Qatar to produce artillery and tanks, an agreement with Kazakhstan to produce UAVs, and a pre-invasion deal with Ukraine to produce UAVs as well. South Korea and Egypt announced in December 2022 their own plans to co-produce artillery and trainer fighter jets. And Egypt and India, two of the largest historic importers of Russian arms, in early 2023 announced plans to enhance defence cooperation.

Gulf countries are some of the most prominent prime examples of working concertedly to establish bona fide defence industrial bases.

Saudi Arabia sought to develop its own base as part of the Vision 2030 framework, and pledged to spend 50 per cent of its defence budget on domestic suppliers by the decade’s close. To that end, it has entered into a joint-UAV production agreement with China, is constructing one of the world’s largest shipyards for civilian and military applications, and has established indigenous defence firms with investment from the country’s Public Investment Fund.

One such firm is Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), which was founded in 2017 and has since signed memorandums of understanding with several leading international defence firms, including US’ Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, France’s Thales and Naval Group, and Russia’s Rosoboronexport.

Likewise, the UAE has created its own domestic defence conglomerate, the EDGE Group, which incorporates more than twenty Emirati defence firms and has a combined annual revenue of approximately $5 billion. EDGE is on the vanguard of Emirati attempts to manufacture platforms locally, an effort gaining momentum in the country. According to the UAE, for the first time in 2023, most of the contracts awarded after the International Defense Exhibition and Conference were to domestic companies.

The impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine can also reverberate in a way where some countries like Israel and Türkiye are poised to capitalize on this changing global market.

Meanwhile, countries like Algeria, which since 2002 has imported approximately 76 per cent of its arms from Russia, may incur negative operational effects amid a shortfall in Russian supply. Countries like Egypt, which in recent years has diversified its arms sources, may suffer operationally but hold advantages from an acquisitions’ standpoint.

Thus, when assessing the effects of the Ukraine invasion, existing weapons clients of Russia—as well as of other countries—will likely grow warier of the risks of overreliance on depending on Moscow as a single supplier.

Iran and the regional balance of power

The increasing military cooperation between Iran and Russia and its potential impact on the balance of power in the Middle East will have significant repercussions for the region. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has led to a reciprocal agreement between Russia and Iran, resulting in the exchange of Iranian drones for cash and captured US and NATO weaponry. This arrangement also opens the door for Iran to acquire more advanced Russian arms, including air defence systems, helicopters, and potentially the advanced Su-35 fighter jet.

While the immediate effect on the Middle East's balance of power may not be substantial, the authors argue that Iran's potential ability to reverse engineer these platforms and enhance its existing asymmetrical capabilities will create challenges for its regional competitors.

This could involve the deployment of Iranian proxies equipped with more advanced weaponry, further complicating the security landscape. Consequently, countries in the region seeking to contain Iran will need to plan around the prospect of a more technologically advanced Iranian military and its network of proxies.

As a result, the deepening defence relationship between Iran and Russia is likely to lead regional countries to increase their own defence spending. The Middle East already features prominently as a major importer of arms, and the authors predict that the prospect of Iran acquiring advanced weaponry, potentially including Russian fighter jets, will further drive regional defence expenditures.

This trend is expected to be driven by concerns about Iran's use of proxies and asymmetric warfare, with countries like Türkiye and Israel well-positioned to meet the demand for countermeasures and systems adapted to such warfare, particularly in air defence systems and UAVs. These countries have developed combat-proven solutions and are poised to take advantage of the higher demand for these platforms.

Furthermore, regional suppliers have the opportunity to strengthen partnerships and diversify the Middle East's defence market. Israel, for example, has already made strides in the defence markets of Gulf countries and Europe. If regional suppliers can offer technology transfers that meet the expectations of their clients, they could quickly establish significant positions in the regional market. This adds another layer of partnership beyond traditional alliances with the West, China, or Russia, while also addressing the core security requirements of Middle Eastern countries.

The growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia is poised to impact the Middle East's balance of power and drive-up regional defence spending. The potential acquisition of advanced weaponry by Iran, along with arming its network of proxies, introduces new complexities for regional security. However, countries like Türkiye and Israel are well-positioned to meet the demand for countermeasures and capitalize on their combat-proven solutions. Regional suppliers have the opportunity to play a significant role in diversifying the defence market and forming partnerships based on technology transfers.