Security concerns hold China back from supporting Damascus' new rulers

Nine months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, China has yet to formally recognise the new government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Beijing, previously a “strategic partner” of the Assad regime, is particularly uneasy about the prominent role of Uyghur foreign fighters within Syria’s security and defence structures.

While China has engaged with the new leadership through its ambassador, an article published by Chatham House suggests these concerns indicate that Beijing will act cautiously and may hesitate to support efforts to lift the remaining UN sanctions on al-Sharaa and other officials.

For his part, the author predicts that al-Sharaa is unlikely to crack down on the foreign fighters that form a critical part of his power base amid continuing instability and conflict with rival factions.

This stalemate comes at a pivotal moment for al-Sharaa, with elections scheduled for mid-September and his first address to the UN General Assembly set to follow. Over the long term, it could also undercut Damascus’s strategy of hedging against overreliance on the United States.

Beijing’s approach appears driven more by security considerations than by commercial interests.

China’s fears over Uyghur fighters and regional security

According to the report, Beijing is troubled by the Syrian government’s decision to integrate Uyghur militants from the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) into its security and defence apparatus.

The TIP, an Islamist militant group that fought alongside al-Sharaa’s former faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), against Assad during the 13-year civil war, is composed mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang region.

Reports indicate that about 3,500 fighters—mostly Uyghurs—have been absorbed into a new Syrian army unit, the 84th Division. TIP’s leader in Syria, Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi (also known as Zahid), has reportedly even been promoted to brigadier general.

China fears that these fighters could eventually redirect their focus toward Chinese territory or interests abroad. Those concerns are reinforced by TIP’s own statements. A video released after Assad’s fall in December 2024 declared the group’s main mission is to “liberate the Muslims of East Turkistan from the Chinese occupation,” referring to Xinjiang.

Another possible threat scenario involves attacks on Chinese commercial projects in the Middle East, mirroring previous incidents in Pakistan. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments and energy supply chains are particularly vulnerable. Beijing currently imports about 35% of Iraq’s oil output, and Chinese companies hold the largest share of foreign stakes in Iraq’s oil and gas industry.

China’s diplomatic balancing act

Chinese Ambassador Shi Hongwei to Damascus has reaffirmed Beijing’s respect for Syrian sovereignty during meetings with al-Sharaa and other officials. China continues to back a “Syrian-led and Syrian-owned” political process in line with UNSC Resolution 2254.

Beijing’s dual-track approach toward Syria reflects its posture toward other states deemed unstable or aligned with Washington. While early commentary likened this to China’s handling of the Taliban, the article argues that the current approach more closely resembles its stance toward Israel—pursuing a diplomatic thaw while maintaining rhetorical pressure at the UN, particularly over Gaza.

By Nazrin Sadigova