Washington’s wedge strategy: how Trump tests Europe’s unity

Trans-Atlantic relations have entered a period of visible strain since Donald Trump returned to the White House for a second term. The publication of the US National Security Strategy in December 2025 crystallised what many European policymakers had already suspected: the current US administration views the European Union less as a partner and more as a geopolitical problem.

An analysis by Deutsche Welle (DW) sheds light on how this outlook is translating into a selective and ideologically driven approach towards Europe — one that risks undermining EU cohesion from within.

At the heart of the controversy is not only the language of the published strategy, which portrays Europe as a “continent in decline,” threatened by migration, erosion of free speech and political repression. More troubling for Brussels was the reported existence of an unpublished draft, allegedly seen by Defense One, which explicitly named Italy, Austria, Poland and Hungary as countries Washington should “work more with” to pull them away from the EU mainstream. Even though the White House has denied the existence of such a draft, the political logic behind this alleged shortlist is revealing.

Hungary is the most straightforward case. Viktor Orbán and Trump share a long-standing political affinity rooted in nationalist, sovereigntist and anti-liberal ideas. For Trump, Orbán represents a reliable spoiler within the EU — a leader willing to challenge Brussels on rule-of-law issues, Russia policy and energy diversification. The reported discussion of a US “financial shield” for Hungary, at a time when EU funds remain frozen, highlights how economic leverage could be used to reward ideological alignment and defiance of EU norms.

Italy’s inclusion is more nuanced. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni leads a right-wing party with post-fascist roots and enjoys clear personal rapport with Trump. Yet, as DW correctly notes, Meloni has proven pragmatic rather than obstructionist at the EU level. This suggests a misreading in Washington: ideological similarity does not automatically translate into willingness to weaken the EU from within, especially when national interests are best served by a stable and functional bloc.

Austria and Poland illustrate another layer of US thinking. Although neither is currently governed by right-wing populists, both have strong eurosceptic forces with a real chance of returning to power. From Washington’s perspective, investing early in such political landscapes may pay dividends later. The Trump administration appears less interested in current governments than in future leverage.

Equally telling is who was left off the list. The absence of the Czech Republic and Slovakia — despite the rise of EU-sceptic leaders like Andrej Babiš and Robert Fico — underlines the ideological filter guiding US policy. As DW cites analyst Daniel Hegedüs, parties without a clear right-populist pedigree are simply not seen as “like-minded,” even if their policies could objectively serve US interests. This points to an approach driven more by identity politics than strategic consistency.

What emerges from DW’s analysis is not a US plan to engineer outright EU exits, but something subtler and potentially more damaging: the gradual erosion of European integration. By supporting ideologically aligned actors, encouraging selective non-compliance — as seen in Hungary’s refusal to follow EU decisions on Russian energy — and legitimising internal dissent, Washington risks normalising fragmentation within the bloc.

By Vugar Khalilov