As Oslo accords turn 22, goal of Palestinian statehood remains feeling unattainable

As the Israel-Hamas war drags on in its second year, September 13 marks 22 years since Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and then-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements — better known as the “Oslo Accord” — at the White House.

More than two decades later, the question of Palestinian statehood remains unresolved, continuing to divide the international community and fuel conflict in the region. On the eve of the anniversary, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted the “New York Declaration,” calling for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question and the implementation of a two-state solution through “concrete, time-bound steps.” The resolution passed with 142 votes in favor, including Azerbaijan, but Israel, the United States, and eight other countries opposed it.

The shortcomings of the Oslo process are often cited when assessing how the region descended into today’s volatile state. Understanding what the agreements promised — and where both sides diverged from them — is crucial.

According to the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU), the Oslo Accords were a series of agreements signed between Israel and the PLO from 1993 to 1999, intended to culminate in a “final status agreement” by 1999 that would “achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace” between Israelis and Palestinians.

The accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern parts of the West Bank while Gaza would be administered by the Israeli military, which was in control of the Strip at the time. The PA was envisioned as an “Interim Self-Government” for no more than five years, after which a final agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 — which called for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war — was supposed to follow. 

Many Palestinians saw Oslo as the first step toward an independent state in those territories, forming the basis of the “two-state solution” long backed by the international community.

The US government's Office of the Historian notes that Israel formally recognized the PLO as the Palestinians’ representative, while the PLO renounced terrorism and acknowledged Israel’s right to exist in peace. The White House signing ceremony, presided over by US President Bill Clinton, marked a historic moment. Though Clinton’s team had played little role in initiating the deal, his administration poured effort into helping both sides implement it. Yet by the end of his presidency in 2001, the peace process had collapsed into renewed violence.

The IMEU points out that "the PLO, an umbrella organization that led the movement since the late 1960s, was sidelined as the Fatah party, which has dominated the PLO since its earliest days, established the PA with Israel. This led to a split and at times open conflict between the PA/Fatah and Palestinian political factions opposed to the Oslo Accords."

Meanwhile, US strategy initially prioritized potential peace with Syria, believing it politically easier for Israel to cede the Golan Heights than the West Bank. American involvement in subsequent accords — from the 1994 Cairo Agreement to the 1995 Oslo II deal — was supportive but not decisive.

Eruption of political chaos in Israel post-Oslo

The 1995 assassination of Rabin by a right-wing Israeli opposed to Oslo, followed by Hamas suicide attacks, undercut support for peace within Israel. The election of Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 brought a government skeptical of Palestinian statehood. 

Fearing a collapse of the peace process, the Clinton administration stepped up its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, brokering the 1997 Hebron Protocol and the 1998 Wye River Memorandum. But political infighting and Netanyahu’s fall in 1999 stalled implementation.

Following his exit, Israeli politics entered a turbulent era, with an unsuccessful attempt at establishing peace with Syria and the infamous Camp David meeting between Israel's new PM Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat where they attempted to reach a final agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

“Accounts differ as to why Camp David failed, but it is clear that despite additional concessions by Barak, the Israelis and Palestinians remained strongly at odds over borders, Jerusalem, and whether Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees’ ‘right of return,’” the US historian’s office explains. Clinton blamed Arafat, while pro-Palestinian critics argued Israel had used Oslo to entrench occupation while being able to shift the administrative burden of taking take of Palestinians onto the PA.

The breakdown was soon followed by the outbreak of a wave of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in what is known as the “al-Aqsa Intifada” after Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Jewish holy site of Temple Mount, where the al-Aqsa Mosque compound is also located. Clinton floated his own proposals in December 2000 for a peace deal, but by then his term was ending, Barak was facing electoral defeat, and violence was escalating.

By the close of 2000, peace seemed further away than ever. While Oslo had brought limited gains — such as Palestinian self-rule in parts of Gaza and the West Bank, and a peace treaty with Jordan — the promise of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained unfulfilled and is yielding its power to divide the world equally today.

By Nazrin Sadigova