China’s mirror: how the US taught beijing the art of global power
A recent Foreign Policy article compellingly argues that much of China’s rise in the 21st century reflects lessons learned from the United States—not through lectures or direct confrontation, but by observing Washington’s example. The piece suggests that China’s leadership has carefully studied both the successes and failures of U.S. power projection and adapted them to its own political, technological, and economic objectives.
At the heart of the article is the observation that Beijing’s strategic priorities—technological self-reliance, supply chain control, and cautious foreign engagement—mirror practices long established by Washington. The rollout of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026–2030 highlights Beijing’s focus on reducing dependence on foreign suppliers for high-end technologies, reflecting a recognition that reliance is vulnerability. Drawing on lessons from the 1960s Sino-Soviet split, when Moscow abruptly cut off critical technology transfers, Chinese leaders have internalized the dangers of external dependence, anticipating that technological chokepoints could be exploited by rival powers.
Initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” and the “dual circulation” strategy exemplify China’s efforts to strengthen domestic innovation while retaining selective engagement with global markets. Foreign Policy notes that these policies are reminiscent of U.S. industrial policy, which similarly recognises the strategic importance of supply chain resilience. However, Beijing differs in its ability to mobilize national resources from the top down, coordinating finance, talent, and administration to accelerate home-grown breakthroughs. The goal is clear: China seeks not only to produce technology but to define global standards in areas like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

The article also underscores China’s mastery of U.S.-style economic statecraft. By implementing export controls on critical minerals such as gallium and germanium, Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to wield supply chains as instruments of leverage, much as the United States has historically used technology restrictions to maintain strategic advantage. Foreign Policy stresses that China’s approach is pragmatic rather than reactionary—it mirrors Washington’s logic of controlling vulnerabilities to exert influence, signaling both to the U.S. and the wider world the cost of overreliance on Beijing.
Perhaps most striking is Beijing’s adoption of U.S. lessons in restraint. Observing Washington’s costly entanglements in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, China has chosen a careful, selective approach to foreign interventions. It engages diplomatically and economically while avoiding the pitfalls of overextension, demonstrating a clear understanding that global influence can be undermined by involvement in conflicts it cannot fully control.
Ultimately, the article positions China not as an aberration or adversary to the international order, but as a student of the system the United States created. From industrial policy to global supply chains and calibrated foreign engagement, Beijing has absorbed and adapted the U.S. playbook to its own rise. The Foreign Policy piece compellingly concludes that the United States’ greatest export to China was not democracy or culture—it was the blueprint of power itself, and China has studied it carefully, crafting a model uniquely its own.
By Vugar Khalilov







