European rearmament: NATO’s new pledge, need for transatlantic strategic unity

As war rages on in Europe and tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific, NATO's European allies have made a landmark commitment: increase defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035. The decision, taken at the recent NATO summit in The Hague, may seem long overdue — yet it signals a deeper shift in strategic thinking. This is not just about budgets or deterrence in Europe. It’s about preparing the transatlantic alliance for a world where security threats are global, interconnected, and increasingly aggressive.

In an unusually concise final communiqué, NATO leaders expressed a firm resolve to strengthen the alliance's defence capabilities. The move was widely hailed as a success — and not without reason. By aligning financial commitments with NATO’s new regional defence plans, the summit sent a clear signal: rearmament is no longer hypothetical. It is a necessity.

Yet the scope of this rearmament cannot be limited to Europe. As CEPA’s Europe Edge points out in its analytical piece, the West now faces an unprecedented convergence of threats across four critical regions: Europe, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific. Two of these theaters — Ukraine and Gaza — are already consumed by conflict. The other two remain fragile, overshadowed by North Korea’s missile provocations and China’s relentless military expansion, especially the naval surge that has now made the PLA Navy larger than the US fleet.

This global outlook requires a fundamental shift in how NATO and its members define their roles. Since the Obama-era "pivot to Asia," the US has been attempting to balance limited military resources by treating theaters of operation as largely separate. But that thinking no longer holds. European allies must not only commit to defending their own continent — they must also consider how to actively support American deterrence efforts in the Indo-Pacific, the article notes. 

This doesn’t mean deploying European troops to the Taiwan Strait. But it does require investments in interoperable technologies, joint procurement strategies, and integration of command-and-control systems across both theaters. For Washington, the value of NATO increases if European militaries reduce their dependency on US forces, thereby freeing up American assets for use in Asia. For Europe, this means defence planning cannot stop at its borders.

The Hague summit has laid the groundwork for this strategic evolution. Higher defence spending and stronger regional defence plans are vital. But success will depend on much more than declarations. It will require deep coordination between defence industries, seamless information-sharing mechanisms, and a mutual commitment to readiness and speed.

In this sense, the rearmament process is more than a European affair — it is a test of whether the Atlantic and Pacific theaters can be conceptually and operationally linked. For decades, America’s allies have assumed that US security guarantees would automatically apply, regardless of region. But in a multipolar, contested world, that guarantee must now be matched by a reciprocal strategic investment.

If NATO and its partners can align their defence efforts accordingly, they will not only deter adversaries in Europe and Asia — they will also reinforce the principle that the security of the West is indivisible. 

As Europe Edge concludes, the future of transatlantic security will be shaped not by lofty promises, but by concrete coordination — in procurement, planning, and presence.

By Sabina Mammadli