GPS warfare spreads beyond Europe as aviation, shipping get targeted

Interference with satellite navigation systems has become one of the fastest-growing threats to global aviation and maritime transport, with the problem spreading far beyond Europe as electronic warfare increasingly spills into civilian airspace and shipping lanes.

European authorities reported that approximately 123,000 flights have already been affected by GPS jamming and spoofing, highlighting the growing scale of disruptions to modern navigation systems. The Baltic Sea region has emerged as one of the world's primary hotspots, where interference with aircraft and ships has become a persistent challenge. However, as a Foreign Policy piece points out, similar disruptions are now rapidly spreading across the Middle East, raising concerns that satellite navigation interference is becoming a feature of modern geopolitical conflicts.

The attacks typically involve two techniques: jamming, which blocks satellite navigation signals altogether, and spoofing, which is considered even more dangerous because it transmits false positioning data, causing aircraft and ships to believe they are somewhere they are not. The result can leave pilots and crews struggling to determine whether the information displayed on their navigation systems reflects reality.

The problem extends well beyond aviation. Commercial shipping relies heavily on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to navigate increasingly congested sea lanes. Without highly accurate satellite positioning, the efficiency and safety of modern air and maritime transport would be significantly reduced.

The growing threat prompted the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to take the unusual step last year of formally condemning deliberate interference with satellite navigation and identifying Russia and North Korea as the principal perpetrators.

Since then, the article notes, the disruptions have only intensified.

According to Lithuania's communications regulator, Russia has dramatically expanded its GPS spoofing infrastructure since the beginning of 2025, increasing the number of spoofing antennas from just three to 36.

The problem has also spread across several other strategic waterways and conflict zones.

"We're seeing manipulation in the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Eastern Med, the Baltic Sea, the Persian Gulf," said Ben Westcott, director of digital services at maritime security company Ambrey. "Ships are either getting no signal or a distorted one."

Joshua Hutchinson, Ambrey's chief commercial officer, described GNSS interference as "the largest threat by volume to the industry at this moment in time."

The aviation sector is experiencing similar challenges.

"Navigational interference used to happen occasionally but now it's basically constant," said Raphael Monstein, co-founder of aviation security consultancy SkAI Data Services.

Unlike the Baltic region, where most interference is attributed to Russia, navigation disruptions across the Middle East stem from multiple actors.

"Israel and Iran (and sometimes others) jam and spoof in the Middle East," Monstein explained. "The navigational interference is basically a measure [by both sides in the Iran war] to keep UAVs out. Civilians are just a casualty."

Episodes of satellite navigation interference have also been reported around India and Pakistan, while Taiwan regularly experiences similar disruptions.

Security experts warn that the barrier to entry for electronic warfare has fallen considerably. Compared with many other military capabilities, GPS jammers can be built and deployed relatively easily, making them increasingly attractive tools for both states and non-state actors.

For commercial airlines operating in affected regions, satellite interference has become an additional operational burden rather than an exceptional event.

Pilots are now routinely briefed before departure about the likelihood of GPS disruptions and must be prepared to verify their aircraft's position using alternative navigation methods whenever satellite signals become unreliable.

"Many airlines have essentially become accustomed to this," Monstein said. "In their briefings, pilots now receive warnings if there's a risk of interference."

While modern commercial airliners are designed to continue operating safely without GPS by relying on multiple redundant navigation systems, experts caution that smaller corporate aircraft often possess fewer backup capabilities, making them more vulnerable to prolonged satellite navigation disruptions.

By Nazrin Sadigova