Iran’s uncertain future: military state or fragmentation? Analysis by Shereshevskiy

There is a widespread view that power in Iran has effectively shifted from the clergy to the military, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This opinion is based, in particular, on the fact that the key appointments following the deaths of the country’s former leaders—the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Larijani—have been associated precisely with the IRGC.

Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late leader, who has been chosen as the new Supreme Leader, is considered a figure closely associated with this structure. The position previously held by Larijani has been taken by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—a former IRGC officer, former deputy chief of the General Staff of Iran’s armed forces, and former head of the Basij militia.

The IRGC is, in effect, a second, independent army of Iran, numbering around 100,000–150,000 personnel, typically composed of the most religiously motivated recruits. It oversees the nuclear program, missile forces, and the militia that is also used to suppress public protests. Under its influence is a network of foreign paramilitary groups allied with Iran, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Palestinian group Hamas.

However, the functions and scope of the IRGC are far broader. It controls numerous government agencies and also exerts influence over the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office. In addition, it oversees a network of major state-owned and private companies that together account for up to half of the country’s GDP. The IRGC is involved in managing oil trade and exports and controls major banking institutions, construction firms, and metallurgical enterprises.

Senior members of this structure actively promote their relatives to key positions. Companies affiliated with the IRGC receive substantial government subsidies, effectively redistributing the country’s economic resources in their favour. The system is permeated by corruption and nepotism, which largely explains the dire state of Iran’s economy, where a significant portion of the population lives at or below the poverty line and inflation reaches up to 50 per cent per year.

Thus, the IRGC acts not only as a military force but also as the political and economic core of Iran’s system. Its leadership is a group of extremely wealthy individuals for whom power and financial flows are inseparably linked. As a Russian expert on Iran, Nikolai Kozhanov notes, they are prepared to go to extreme lengths to preserve their position.

At the same time, the very process of redistributing power from the Shiite clergy to the security structures has been observed by specialists for quite some time.

Initially, the Islamic Republic was not conceived as a military dictatorship. The country was governed by the Supreme Leader—an authoritative Shiite theologian and jurist who held nearly absolute power. The IRGC was seen as one of the institutions subordinate to him—a kind of second, ideological army.

Among the clergy who came to power as a result of the 1978–1979 revolution, there was no unity regarding the country’s future structure. For example, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, the leader of the Shiites of Tehran, drawing on a powerful movement of factory and neighbourhood workers’ councils, advocated the creation of a classless society. At the same time, liberal, leftist, and nationalist forces retained influence.

Over time, it was the IRGC that played a key role in eliminating these forces, enabling the concentration of power in the hands of the Supreme Leader. However, it later transformed from an instrument into a dominant force itself. One of the leading researchers of modern Iran, Ali Alfoneh, argues in his works that the country is gradually transforming from an Islamic republic into a military dictatorship.

In Iran itself, in recent years, the phrase has often been heard: “men in boots are pushing out men in turbans.” It has also been said that the Supreme Leader has effectively “outsourced the country” to the IRGC in exchange for their loyalty and the maintenance of stability.

This process appears to have accelerated. The new Supreme Leader has not appeared in public: there are no video recordings, not even audio addresses. Questions are arising about his condition—whether he is alive and capable of performing his duties. Official Iranian media have reported that he was injured during Israeli airstrikes.

In any case, the impression is forming that real power may lie not with him, but with those who control access to him and make decisions on his behalf. If he is unable even to record an address, the question remains open: how exactly is the country being governed?

But even if we assume that Iran is being governed by the IRGC leadership, is it capable of effectively coordinating among itself and issuing orders to subordinates? Reports of the elimination of high-ranking officials are coming in almost daily. Since the beginning of the war on February 28, the U.S.-Israeli coalition has reportedly killed more than 40 representatives of the Iranian leadership, including Ali Khamenei and a significant portion of the military command. The New York Times, citing intelligence sources, reports that Iranian ministers and IRGC leaders are extremely reluctant to contact one another, fearing strikes from Israel and the United States.

At the same time, the army and the IRGC continue to function thanks to the decentralisation of command. As early as the 12-day war in 2025, it became clear that Israel and the United States were capable of systematically eliminating central command structures. As a result, the command system was dispersed.

Today, individual military units operate to a large extent autonomously—for example, launching missile and drone strikes on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and on targets in neighbouring countries, relying on pre-established target banks. However, this raises a new question: could such decentralisation, amid a weakening chain of command, lead to the disintegration of the state?

A number of experts believe that Iran is moving toward what is known as a “garrison state.” Army units and the Basij militia are widely present in cities, primarily focused on suppressing protests. The authorities fear a repeat of the events of March 8–10, when millions of people in various regions of the country took to the streets demanding the overthrow of the regime, and these demonstrations were harshly suppressed. Military forces are actively moving through cities, setting up checkpoints—including under bridges—in an effort to reduce vulnerability to Israeli drone strikes. At the same time, a significant portion of the industry and transport is paralysed, and the population is trying to go outside as rarely as possible.

Under such conditions, state functions may degrade to a basic level—forceful control over territory and population, establishing an order convenient for the military elite. If strikes by the U.S.-Israeli coalition continue and the economy fails to return to normal functioning, the IRGC and Basij armed structures risk turning into forces operating according to a logic of coercive resource extraction.

Ali Alfoneh believes that if the regime survives, Iran may move closer to a model resembling North Korea. If the regime falls, he considers the scenario of the country’s fragmentation highly likely. Another possible outcome is a Syrian-style scenario.

After the onset of mass protests in 2011, Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime gradually contracted over several years to a core of forces loyal to him—such as the Fourth Division and various militias, including local defence units. In practice, these were military units loyal to Assad, ethno-sectarian formations from the Alawite minority, and semi-criminal groups. Against the backdrop of an economic crisis, the social state in Syria effectively ceased to function. 

To maintain their own stability, the military and loyalist formations began extracting resources from businesses and the population. This, in turn, fueled protest sentiments: the implicit social contract was broken—the state no longer fulfilled its obligations, yet continued to seize resources. As a result, the forces supporting the regime became targets of widespread hatred. Regular Israeli strikes, which undermined the loyalists’ military capacity, also played a significant role. Ultimately, this combination of pressures contributed to the collapse of Assad’s regime.

The future of Iran remains uncertain. Whether it will evolve into a regime resembling the military governments of Latin America in the last century, or follow a more dramatic Syrian-style trajectory, is impossible to determine at this point.