Phased peace in Gaza: lessons from history Analysis by Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs recently examined the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas signed in Egypt on October 9, highlighting both the promise and the precariousness of the Trump administration’s 20-point plan. The article underscores a central theme: the phased structure of the agreement—partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the release of nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of remaining Israeli hostages—reflects a time-tested strategy in Middle Eastern diplomacy, but its ultimate success hinges on sustained international oversight.

Critics of the plan worry that deferring key issues, including Gaza’s postwar governance and the composition of a stabilization force, risks undermining the agreement. Yet the Foreign Affairs analysis situates the Trump plan within a long historical lineage of phased peace efforts in the region. From the 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice agreements to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, incremental agreements have often provided the only viable path toward lasting stability. By addressing immediate de-escalation first and deferring complex political questions, these agreements created the space for trust-building, negotiations, and the implementation of enforcement mechanisms.

The article highlights that historical phased agreements were rarely standalone achievements. U.S. sponsorship played a decisive role in their durability, providing diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, military aid, and even peacekeeping forces to ensure compliance. The 1949 armistices, for example, established provisional borders and created field committees monitored by the United Nations, ultimately yielding a relative peace that endured until 1967. Similarly, the 1970s disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria relied on active U.S. involvement and incremental steps, including troop withdrawals, demilitarized zones, and prisoner exchanges, before leading to broader peace talks.

Foreign Affairs draws lessons from both successes and failures. While agreements such as the Camp David Accords and the 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty demonstrate that phased implementation can lead to major breakthroughs, the Oslo Accords illustrate the dangers of insufficient enforcement. The Oslo plan faltered not because of its incremental approach, but due to weak international commitment and the absence of effective mechanisms, incentives, and penalties. By contrast, the Gaza cease-fire’s sustainability will depend heavily on whether Washington and its international partners can maintain robust involvement, enforce compliance, and provide tangible inducements for cooperation.

The article stresses that flexibility, monitoring, and enforcement are essential for any phased deal to succeed. Joint committees, international stabilization forces, and coordinated humanitarian relief are all necessary components. Incentives—ranging from reconstruction aid to diplomatic guarantees—and credible sanctions for noncompliance must accompany each phase. Without these measures, even a well-designed phased agreement risks collapse under internal and external pressures.

Ultimately, Foreign Affairs frames the Gaza cease-fire as a pragmatic first step rather than a comprehensive solution. By examining decades of Middle Eastern diplomacy, the article demonstrates that the phased approach, when coupled with sustained international and regional engagement, can transform temporary de-escalation into lasting stability. The Trump plan’s initial success in halting hostilities shows the potential of phased diplomacy—but history cautions that turning this fragile cease-fire into enduring peace will require careful, step-by-step implementation, backed by unwavering international commitment.

By Vugar Khalilov