Why Washington is reasserting control over Latin America Trump’s “new Monroe Doctrine”

Two hundred years after President James Monroe warned European empires to keep out of the Western Hemisphere, the Trump administration has formally revived this long-controversial doctrine — and elevated it to the centre of US foreign policy. A recent National Security Strategy (NSS), as argued by The Conversation, makes clear that Latin America is no longer just a regional priority: it is the top international priority in Washington’s hierarchy.

At the heart of this shift is a distinctly Trumpian reframing of hemispheric politics. The NSS introduces what some analysts call a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine — a bold assertion that the era of US dominance in Latin America is not over but entering a new, more openly interventionist phase. The Middle East, it states, is “thankfully over” as America’s strategic obsession. The Western Hemisphere is again “America’s backyard”.

Re-militarisation under an anti-China banner

The NSS places Latin America within the broader lens of great-power competition. It openly links the administration’s rhetoric on “narco-terrorists” with efforts to contain China’s influence. Beijing’s investments in energy, minerals, ports and digital infrastructure are now framed as direct threats to US security.

Against this backdrop, Washington’s increasingly lethal interdictions in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific — strikes on suspected drug boats that have killed dozens — are presented domestically as essential defence measures. International law experts disagree, questioning their legality and the absence of congressional approval. Yet, for the White House, these actions serve a dual narrative: combatting cartels and pushing back against perceived Chinese encroachment on strategic waterways.

Selective enforcement, selective partners

The NSS also sheds light on the administration’s striking contradictions. The decision to pardon former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández — convicted of facilitating major drug shipments into the US — appears at odds with the “war on narco-terrorists”. But, as The Conversation notes, Trump’s foreign policy is “not grounded in ideology”; it is grounded in utility.

Hernández remains a useful ally with strong connections among Honduran elites and security structures. In Washington’s calculus, loyalty trumps legality. Moreover, the timing — days before the Honduran elections — suggests an effort to bolster conservative networks and influence outcomes favourable to US interests.

Venezuela: the focal point

Venezuela dominates the strategic logic of the new NSS. With the world’s largest proven oil reserves and a critical position on the Caribbean Sea, the country sits at the intersection of energy, geography and geopolitics. Years of US sanctions pushed Caracas towards China, Russia and Iran. For Washington, reversing this trajectory is essential.

Although the NSS avoids naming Venezuela explicitly, the target is transparent. Any alignment between Caracas and Beijing is deemed unacceptable. The possibility — reported by the New York Times — that Maduro may offer Washington privileged access to oil and gold resources underscores how dramatically regional geopolitics may shift.

Yet many in Washington still view regime change as the ultimate prize. Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado has pitched a post-Maduro future worth trillions to Western investors, fuelling expectations of vast profits under a new government.

A region without a unified response

Latin America’s reaction has been muted. Regional organisations are fragmented and hesitant to challenge Washington directly. Some governments hope to curry favour; others fear being labelled “narco-states”.

Two centuries after Monroe, the pattern endures: the United States still sees the hemisphere as a space where it can act freely — and where power, not principle, defines its engagement.

By Vugar Khalilov