Germany raises alarm over possible Iranian attacks in Europe

Germany’s domestic intelligence agency has warned that Iran could intensify operations against targets across Europe once the current conflict involving Israel and the United States subsides, including possible attacks on Jewish and Israeli institutions, Iranian dissidents, and other perceived opponents of the regime.

The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence service, told Euractiv that it is monitoring cases involving individuals based in Germany who travelled to Iran for military training or otherwise “placed themselves in the service” of Iranian authorities.

“The activities are being investigated by the BfV’s counter-espionage division,” the agency said.

“The BfV assesses that, following the end of the war, the Iranian regime could deploy its intelligence services to track down and target opponents of the regime, including (pro-)Jewish, (pro-)Israeli and US targets, Iranian dissidents, and other individuals deemed ‘traitors’,” the agency added.

Although the Israeli-US campaign has significantly weakened Iran’s security apparatus, intelligence officials fear Tehran could redirect resources toward overseas operations once immediate pressure on the regime eases.

According to the BfV, Iranian intelligence services are prepared to use methods amounting to state terrorism.

“These range from threats against targeted individuals to surveillance operations carried out in preparation for attack plots,” the agency said.

German intelligence sources told Euractiv that at least several dozen individuals had travelled from Germany to Iran and later worked on behalf of the Iranian regime.

Among them are two men from Hamburg who appeared in a propaganda video at a Basij militia checkpoint carrying assault rifles. One of the men, identified as Benjamin G., is believed to be connected to the wider circle of the Islamic Centre Hamburg (IZH), which German authorities long considered Tehran’s most important outpost in Europe before it was banned in 2024.

Former Berlin resident Ashkan K., who recently relocated to Tehran, publicly called on Iranians living abroad to “serve our country in this national defence. The options are plentiful.”

In other cases cited by intelligence officials, several individuals who left Germany for Iran later participated in propaganda campaigns defending the regime and urging “every Iranian, regardless of where they are,” to “contribute to the defence of the homeland.”

One individual featured in propaganda videos from Tehran is Aitak Barani, a longtime German resident and Hamas supporter who was convicted and fined in Frankfurt last year for glorifying Hamas’ October 7 attacks on Israel.

The BfV warned that “the abstract threat level posed by Iranian intelligence services to (pro-)Jewish, (pro-)Israeli targets, as well as Iranian opposition individuals and groups in Germany, remains high.”

The agency added that Iranian intelligence services often rely on proxies linked to organised crime networks operating in target countries to conduct state-sponsored terrorist activities.

According to the BfV, since March 2026 the Iranian regime has increasingly relied on a recruitment campaign operating under the name Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI). The group reportedly uses social media channels within pro-Iranian and Shiite extremist circles to publicise its activities.

Researcher Adrian Shtuni told Euractiv that HAYI’s operational model depends on “low-sophistication, high-volume attacks carried out by disposable local recruits – often young petty criminals or minors – contacted via Snapchat or Telegram and paid small sums of cash.”

Shtuni said he had documented 17 attacks linked to HAYI across Europe, most involving crude explosive devices or nighttime arson attacks.

“By deploying young, low-cost, disposable operatives, states or networks can generate threats that are difficult to predict or track, costly to counter, and even harder to disrupt with conventional counterterrorism methods,” he said.

He warned that a constant flow of lower-level HAYI-linked incidents could strain European security services by forcing authorities to protect soft targets such as synagogues, schools, and community centres while simultaneously monitoring expanding online extremist activity.

“A dual-track approach – namely HAYI-style low-cost harassment potentially combined with more sophisticated plots by trained returnees or reactivated sleeper cells – represents a plausible risk that European authorities should prepare for,” Shtuni said.

On May 15, the US Department of Justice announced the arrest of Mohammad Baqer Al-Saadi, a senior commander in the Iraqi Shia militia Kataib Hezbollah and an alleged key facilitator behind HAYI operations.

“In the span of just three months, Mohammad Al-Saadi allegedly directed 18 terrorist attacks throughout Europe – including against United States citizens and interests – and planned to conduct a similar attack here in our country,” FBI Assistant Director James C. Barnacle Jr. said after Al-Saadi was arrested by the FBI while travelling through Türkiye.

By Vafa Guliyeva