Japan debates nuclear arms in face of North Korean and Chinese threats

The prospect of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons, once inconceivable due to its unique history as the only nation to have endured a nuclear attack, is now gaining attention in political and public discourse.

Since the 1990s, Beijing has consistently rejected Washington’s invitations to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations, choosing instead to expand and modernize its arsenal.

China's estimated 500 nuclear warheads are on track to double by 2030, Caliber.Az reports citing the foreign media.

These advances, along with North Korea’s, have had significant effects in the region. Despite US security assurances, a majority of South Koreans now support developing their own nuclear weapons, and Japan’s long-standing aversion to nuclear arms is weakening. Asia appears to be heading towards a destabilizing arms race.

However, Washington still has an opportunity to address these concerns. In February, Beijing invited the world’s nuclear states to negotiate a “no first use” treaty. The United States, which has over ten times as many nuclear weapons as China, maintains a first-use option. After numerous rejected advances, the United States should welcome China’s willingness to engage. If Beijing is prepared to negotiate in good faith, Washington should respond positively and push for a broader arms control agreement.

Washington must engage in tough, even coercive diplomacy, making it clear that Beijing faces a stark choice: participate meaningfully in substantive negotiations or face a massive US-backed nuclear buildup in its own backyard. If Chinese leaders decline, Washington could begin discussions with Seoul and Tokyo about nuclear-sharing arrangements and accelerate the modernization and expansion of its own arsenal, channeling investments into its nuclear weapons defense industrial base.

Some observers might object to this tough approach, arguing that it will contribute to nuclear proliferation. However, there is an instructive precedent for Washington’s use of coercion to bring states to the arms control negotiating table. In 1983, Washington deployed nuclear-tipped Pershing II missiles in West Germany and ground-launched cruise missiles in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. Rather than prompting escalation, this aggressive move compelled Moscow to engage in diplomacy, leading to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated all intermediate-range forces from Europe.

By adopting a similar strategy, Washington can pressure Beijing to negotiate, thereby preventing a destabilizing arms race in Asia.

Today, Washington should bolster its missile defenses and those of its allies, increase deployments of nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear-capable bombers, and explore nuclear-sharing arrangements with Seoul and Tokyo. These steps, reminiscent of the measures that brought the Soviet Union to the bargaining table in the past, could similarly persuade China to engage in negotiations.

A coercive approach toward China would require the backing of South Korea and Japan. Notably, the South Korean public is increasingly looking beyond US assurances of nuclear deterrence. Two national polls conducted this year found that over 70 per cent of South Koreans believe their country needs its own nuclear arsenal. Although South Korean elites tend to disagree, a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that 61 per cent of academics, experts, businesspeople, politicians, and officials surveyed would support a nuclear-sharing option with the United States "if necessary."

This middle-ground approach would involve Washington redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, which has not hosted such weapons since 1991 when the George H. W. Bush administration withdrew all US nuclear arms as part of a broader global drawdown. By adopting these measures, Washington can exert pressure on Beijing to participate in meaningful arms control negotiations, thus averting a destabilizing arms race in Asia.

In Japan, the concept of developing nuclear weapons was once unimaginable due to its unique history as the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack. However, as early as 2002, Shinzo Abe, then a member of Japan’s House of Representatives and not yet prime minister, claimed that “the possession of nuclear bombs is constitutional, so long as they are small.” Despite a 2020 poll showing that 75 per cent of the Japanese public still supports a global ban on nuclear weapons, some Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders have become more open to the idea. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Abe suggested that Japan should explore a NATO-style nuclear-sharing agreement with the United States. A March 2022 survey revealed that 63 per cent of Japanese were receptive to discussions on nuclear-sharing. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was even more direct, stating in 2023 that Japan was “heading towards becoming a nuclear power in five years.”

Currently, Tokyo remains committed to nonproliferation, particularly under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, an LDP member with family roots in Hiroshima. However, Kishida’s political future is uncertain, and potential successors within the LDP are more amenable to nuclear weapons. As China expands its nuclear capabilities and North Korean nuclear threats persist, Japanese leaders might start to adopt views similar to those of South Korean leaders. In recent years, some Japanese officials have questioned the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, suggesting that Japan might need to develop its own arsenal. “We respect the ideals of nonproliferation, provided that the US nuclear guarantee is perfect,” said Nobukatsu Kanehara, former assistant chief of cabinet secretary under Abe, in 2021. He added a significant caveat: “Is it? That is the great, great concern for us.”