Russia's return to Middle East: What did Putin discuss with Tehran, Riyadh?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently embarked on a multi-state tour, significant not only because those have become a rarity ever since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, but also because of its timing. He visited the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Araba within one day, only a short time after the outbreak of the recent round of escalations between Israel and the Hamas militant group. The President of Iran made a similarly rare visit to Moscow this week, seemingly an extension of President Putin's Middle East campaign. The precise details of the discussions during those meetings remain unknown, yet the National publication has provided their analysis of those events, including information obtained by sources close to the said administrations. Caliber.Az reprints a fragment of this article.

"Shortly after his visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Mr Putin hosted Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow. There, Mr Putin is said to have urged his Iranian counterpart not to close the door to efforts to reach an agreement on Gaza. Mr Raisi agreed to Mr Putin’s request, marking a significant development.

However, reportedly, when Mr Putin asked Mr Raisi to reduce Iran’s support towards proxy groups in the region, his response was that this depended on Israel’s actions, particularly concerning Lebanon. In other words, Mr Raisi linked the activities of Iran’s network of non-state actors, from the Houthis in Yemen to the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, to Israel’s actions towards Hezbollah.

I am given to understand that Mr Raisi told Mr Putin that if Israel initiates a major attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran will not remain passive. But Mr Raisi also assured Mr Putin that Iran would not incite Hezbollah to take actions that could trigger retaliatory Israeli operations.

Mr Putin, meanwhile, sought Mr Raisi’s support for his efforts for greater reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He conveyed that he had discussed this matter with the Saudi leadership. While Russia would not attempt to replace China in sponsoring a Saudi-Iranian agreement, Beijing is currently preoccupied with its economic priorities.

The Russian President, it seems, would like to create a political coalition involving Moscow, Tehran and Riyadh, transforming the latter into partners of each other rather than adversaries and leading – as he might see it – to greater Saudi distance from the US. However, this may not necessarily align with Riyadh’s priorities.

Among Saudi priorities is the desire for Russia to convince Iran in restraining the destabilising activities of the Houthis, with the group provoking the US in the surrounding seas, undermining maritime security and freedom of navigation. Riyadh has also urged Washington to exercise patience and refrain from retaliation.

The Russian leadership assured the Iranian leadership of Moscow’s continued presence in Syria but made it clear that the primary responsibility lies with Tehran to ensure mutual interests there, namely the continuation of Bashar Al Assad’s presidency, while preventing conflict between Syria and Israel. Russia committed to providing Iran with all military assistance.

What about Russia’s role in Gaza? The reality is that Moscow’s positions vis-a-vis Israel and Hamas are uncomfortable, posing a dilemma for it – a new and unconventional development in its role in the Middle East that could constrain its options.

Russia finds itself unable to confront Israel, and it cannot refrain from supporting Hamas either. Therefore, it is unable to offer anything substantial to shift the Gaza issue to a new stage, but it can create the appearance of making a comeback in the Middle East, not necessarily through the Palestinian issue but rather in the Iranian-Arab-Israeli context".