The future of Syria after Latakia Division, chaos, or a new war?

Supporters of Bashar al-Assad, the former ruler of Syria, have rebelled in Latakia, which ended in catastrophe.

The rebels, though few in number, are likely linked to the security forces of the former regime. Officers from the former Fourth Division, which was commanded by the ousted dictator's brother, Maher al-Assad, are reportedly involved. The uprising may have been a response to the arrests of individuals suspected of committing crimes.

Latakia and some other regions of Syria, where the uprisings took place, are home to Alawites – followers of a Shiite branch of Islam. However, they keep their beliefs secret, making it difficult to determine exactly what they entail and how closely the Alawites align with Shiism. The Alawite community makes up about 10-12 percent of Syria's 23 million population, while Sunni Muslims account for approximately 80 percent.

Bashar al-Assad's family belonged to the Alawite sect. This regime ruled the country for half a century, and through a network of state and private companies, it controlled about half of Syria's GDP. It was the Alawites who held key positions in the security apparatus of the former Syrian state. When the uprising against Assad began in 2011, the government created, largely from Alawites, the "Shabiha" militia, which ruthlessly eliminated Assad's opponents. During the civil war, approximately 400,000 Syrians were killed, and around 10 million became refugees.

However, the majority of Alawites belonged to the poorest segments of Syrian society, had no power, and did not benefit from the fact that the country was ruled by an Alawite family.

In November-December 2024, during a lightning-fast offensive that lasted just 11 days, the opposition group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) captured all the major cities of Syria, including the capital, Damascus. Assad fled. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of HTS, declared himself president. The country almost universally celebrated Assad's fall, as he had become loathed by everyone due to the poverty and mass repression brought about by his regime.

It seemed that the civil war was over. But this was an illusion.

In Latakia and several other areas, arrests began of former members of Assad's security forces suspected of committing crimes. In response, these individuals staged a rebellion in Latakia.

The new Syrian regime, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, sent tens of thousands of fighters to Latakia. Among them were not only elite units of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), armed with drones, but also some poorly disciplined brigades that had been recently formed. Alongside them, Sunni militias from various groups were operating in the region.

The uprising itself was quickly suppressed, though some rebel units managed to retreat to the mountainous areas. After quelling the rebellion, the victors entered the villages and towns of the Alawites. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), based in the UK, reported that about 745 civilians were killed in approximately 30 attacks on Alawites on March 7-8. Rami Abdulrahman, the head of SOHR, noted that the killings in Jableh, Banyas, and neighboring areas along the predominantly Alawite-populated coastline were among the most brutal episodes of violence in the entire Syrian civil war, which began in 2011.

The HTS government responded to these events. The authorities in Damascus acknowledged human rights violations during operations against the "remnants of Assad's militias." They blamed the violence against the Alawites on disorganized militia groups that supported the official security forces.

But now HTS also faces problems. A significant portion of Syria's population consists of ethnic and religious minorities. Ahmed al-Sharaa does not control about 40 percent of Syrian territory, which is under the control of Kurdish and Druze armed groups. Even if the killings of civilians in Latakia are primarily linked to militias loyal to HTS but not directly under its control, the question arises: how capable is the president of the country in managing these loyal forces? What will happen when and if they enter other regions?

Kurdish armed groups control areas to the north and east of the Euphrates River—about one-third of the country—where Syria's main oil reserves are located. Around 2.5 million Kurds and a similar number of Arabs live in these territories. In southern Syria, there is the Suwayda region, home to around 700,000 Druze; this area is controlled by Druze armed militias. The neighboring Sunni area of Daraa is controlled by local militias that have poor relations with the government in Damascus.

Previously, there was widespread discussion about transferring control of all these regions to the official Damascus government, but now it is unclear how feasible such a plan is. The HTS government advocates for a unitary, centralized Syria. However, after the recent events, it is uncertain whether the minorities residing in Syria will agree to submit to Damascus.

There is also an external factor at play. Israel, whose forces are advancing in the southern regions of the country, supports the federalization of Syria along the lines of Iraq, where each ethnic and confessional canton would have its own armed forces and regional government. Currently, some circles are even discussing a plan to create a corridor from the Druze-controlled Suwayda to the areas controlled by Kurdish armed groups, with the goal of uniting them under the protection of the Israeli army. Israel, like other Middle Eastern countries, intends to surround its territory with a network of friendly Syrian proxy forces. After the events in Latakia, these plans may be close to implementation.