US-China military encounters in the Indo-Pacific A ticking time bomb

A U.S. B-52 bomber flying over the South China Sea last October came within ten feet of a Chinese fighter jet—one of a series of near misses highlighting the growing risk of accidental conflict between the world’s two largest militaries. Foreign Affairs argues that such incidents underscore a persistent strategic challenge: the absence of reliable, high-level military communication channels between Washington and Beijing, a gap that could transform small errors into catastrophic escalation.

Historically, the United States has attempted to manage its military relationship with China through measures modelled after U.S.-Soviet Cold War diplomacy. Agreements like the 1972 Incidents at Sea and the 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Incidents treaty helped Washington and Moscow avert disaster despite decades of nuclear rivalry. Similar efforts with Beijing began in the 1980s with modest exchanges on military doctrine and training, only to be disrupted by the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Subsequent crises—the 1994 Yellow Sea incident and the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Strait crisis—reinforced the need for formal communication channels. U.S. efforts from 1996 to 1999, including the 1998 Military Maritime Agreement and a hotline between U.S. and Chinese leaders, marked a high point in bilateral military diplomacy, but they never fully achieved their aims.

Foreign Affairs emphasises that China’s reluctance to formalise confidence-building measures stems from deep strategic suspicions. Beijing fears that codifying military protocols would cement an inferior status relative to the U.S., constrain its operational freedom, and compromise the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the People’s Liberation Army. The PLA is deliberately opaque, fostering uncertainty in deployments, doctrine, and crisis responses to create leverage and deter U.S. operations in the region. Even when some PLA officers advocate for transparency, party leadership prioritises flexibility and control over trust-building, a dynamic that has persisted across decades.

The article also illustrates the high stakes: recent near misses—such as the June 2023 USS Chung-Hoon incident in the Taiwan Strait—reveal the potential for accidental war, exacerbated by the growing parity of U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet context, China does not appear particularly concerned about escalation risks from poorly managed interactions; ambiguity is seen as a strategic asset. Washington’s challenge, Foreign Affairs argues, is to overcome this structural distrust and create robust crisis-communication channels before a misstep triggers a broader confrontation.

The analysis concludes with a stark warning: while progress may be slow or even insufficient, proactive engagement is essential. The stakes are too high for the U.S. and China to rely on chance. With both powers holding immense military firepower and operating in close proximity across the Indo-Pacific, even minor accidents could escalate into a conflict neither side desires. U.S. policymakers must persist in crafting mechanisms that prevent miscalculation, mitigate misunderstandings, and maintain operational predictability—lest history repeat the Cuban missile crisis, this time with far greater destructive potential.

By Vugar Khalilov