Brotherly fire: When Gulf unity turns into strategic rivalry

In its characteristically dry and incisive style, The Economist dissects the escalating rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—a dispute that has shifted from polite diplomatic euphemisms to open strategic confrontation. What began with carefully worded references to “brotherly” ties has evolved into airstrikes, proxy clashes, economic friction and a battle of narratives that is reshaping Gulf geopolitics.

The article’s central argument is that this is no minor disagreement but the culmination of years of diverging ambitions between two powers that once presented themselves as the twin pillars of Gulf order. For decades, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi aligned closely within institutions such as the Gulf Co-operation Council and OPEC, fought together in Yemen, and deepened economic integration, with bilateral trade reaching $31bn annually. Yet beneath that partnership lay structural tensions.

The turning points identified are revealing. First, diverging interests in Yemen, where Emirati-backed separatists clashed with Saudi-supported forces. Then Sudan’s civil war in 2023, which exposed a sharper divide: the Saudis backed the national army, while the Emiratis supported the Rapid Support Forces. What Riyadh viewed as reckless interference near its Red Sea flank, Abu Dhabi justified as pragmatic engagement with effective actors over failing central governments.

The Economist frames the feud as both political and personal. Saudi Arabia, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, sees itself as primus inter pares in the Gulf, anchored by demographic weight, religious legitimacy and G20 status. The UAE, under President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, views itself as more economically diversified, militarily agile and strategically nimble. It no longer accepts automatic Saudi leadership. The metaphor of the UAE as a “rebellious younger sibling,” cited in the piece, captures Riyadh’s lingering hierarchical mindset—and Abu Dhabi’s irritation at it.

Ideological differences further widen the rift. The UAE’s deep hostility toward political Islam contrasts with Saudi Arabia’s more flexible pragmatism toward Islamist actors. Their approaches to Israel, Sudan, Somalia and Syria also diverge. Rather than a unified Gulf bloc projecting stability, the article depicts competitive interventionism, where each power backs rival factions across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

The economic dimension heightens concern. Reports of bureaucratic hurdles for Emirati firms in Saudi Arabia, border slowdowns and visa obstacles suggest that economic leverage is becoming a tool of pressure. Although a full embargo akin to the 2017 Qatar crisis appears unlikely, business leaders are quietly preparing contingency plans. The fact that Qatar—once blockaded by both states—is now mediating adds a layer of geopolitical irony.

Washington’s role is portrayed as cautious and complicated. Although President Donald Trump publicly claimed he could resolve the crisis, diplomats suggest reluctance to intervene decisively between two wealthy partners with strong lobbying presence in the United States. Meanwhile, the UAE’s alignment with Israel strengthens its standing in Washington, adding another dimension to the balance.

Ultimately, The Economist suggests that this dispute reflects a broader transformation of Gulf politics. The old model—Saudi dominance with Emirati alignment—has given way to competitive multipolarity within the Gulf itself. The crisis was years in the making and, as the article concludes, shows little sign of resolution. What is at stake is not merely bilateral harmony, but the future architecture of power in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.

By Vugar Khalilov