In the shadow of PACE Lies and diplomacy

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) recently took a controversial stance by refusing to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation. The decision, made on the opening day of the session, was based on the assertion that Azerbaijan has “not fulfilled major commitments” since its accession to the Council of Europe (CoE) 20 years ago, Adnan Huseyn, founder of re:Azerbaijan, wrote this in an article on the online publishing platform Medium on January 31 January.

PACE serves as the parliamentary arm of the CoE, a 46-nation international organization dedicated to upholding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

With 14 out of the 46 CoE member countries, Azerbaijan stands as a strategic partner, while enjoying ally status with one. Beyond the confines of the CoE, Azerbaijan has fostered robust and mutually respectful bilateral relations with these nations. This has positioned Azerbaijan as a “reliable, trustworthy partner,” a sentiment underscored by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission.

During her meeting with President Aliyev in Baku in the summer of 2022, von der Leyen emphasized Azerbaijan’s crucial role in international partnerships. Her acknowledgement extends beyond mere diplomatic niceties, reaching into the core aspects of cooperation. Notably, almost two years before Azerbaijan secured the bid to host 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference, more commonly known as COP29, von der Leyen commended Azerbaijan’s significance as a pivotal energy partner. In her words, “You are indeed a crucial energy partner for us and you have always been reliable. You were a crucial partner not only for our security of supply, but also in our efforts to become climate neutral.”

Ursula von der Leyen (left) and Ilham Aliyev (right) in Baku, July 2022

Speaking of foreign actors who assess their relations with Azerbaijan in a positive light, it is noteworthy to mention President Charles Michel of the European Council. His demonstrated genuine intent for Armenia and Azerbaijan to find common ground and sign a peace agreement stands out. President Michel not only endorses peace but actively welcomes breakthroughs in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.

A significant instance occurred when Michel was among the first to comment on the joint statement issued by Armenia and Azerbaijan on December 7th of the previous year. Taking to his social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, President Michel expressed his delight at the major breakthrough in relations. His post highlighted the significance of the release of detainees and the unprecedented opening in political dialogue. President Michel emphasized that establishing and deepening bilateral dialogue between the two sides has been a key objective of the EU-led Brussels process. He regarded the progress made on that day as a crucial step forward, encouraging the leaders to expedite the finalization of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s positive global engagements are exemplified by the commitment announced at the Global Gateway Investors Forum for the European Union — Central Asia Transport Connectivity, which commenced with a plenary session on January 29 in Brussels. In this forum, European and international financial institutions pledged a substantial 10 billion euros to invest in the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connecting Europe and Central Asia. Teresa Czerwinska, Vice-President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), highlighted the vital role of transport in the modern economy and the significance of sustainable transport in addressing climate impact.

The long-term objective is to enhance the capacities of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor. The forum serves as a platform for deliberating specific actions and mobilizing financial commitments to strengthen this pivotal transport network. The development of the Trans-Caspian transport network now forms a crucial part of the deepened EU-Central Asia cooperation. Originating from Southeast Asia and China, the multimodal route traverses Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and further extends into European countries. This commitment not only underscores Azerbaijan’s role in fostering regional connectivity but also highlights positive partnerships beyond the confines of biased organizations.

Regrettably, the positive sentiment towards Azerbaijan is not universally shared, with notable figures like Emmanuel Macron, Josep Borrell, and Dunja Mijatović displaying a pronounced pro-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijan stance. This divergence is particularly evident in the case of French President Emmanuel Macron and members of his cabinet, who have consistently exhibited a bias against Azerbaijan. This partiality reached a point where Azerbaijan decided to revoke France’s role as one of the mediators between Armenia and Azerbaijan, effectively stripping it of its position as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The deterioration in relations between Azerbaijan and France has reached unprecedented levels, as highlighted by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on January 27th. Minister Bayramov emphasized that Azerbaijan, in no way, initiated actions leading to the crisis in relations with France. He stated, “Relations between France and Azerbaijan are currently at their lowest level point in history. It is evident to everyone that the primary reason for the deterioration of the relationship does not lie with Azerbaijan.”

The Foreign Minister further revealed that France consistently played a provocative role, often resorting to unacceptable actions, including public statements containing elements of threats and intimidation against Azerbaijan. Many of these actions, according to Minister Bayramov, have remained unknown to the Azerbaijani public. He asserted confidently that France has been the leading force behind systematic efforts targeting Azerbaijan, often operating covertly across various platforms.

I have previously delved into France’s negative role in the region in my articles, one of particular interest to readers being my coverage of the theatrical visit of the Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

Unveiled on March 6th, 2017, a report from the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center Analysis delves into a disconcerting investigation. The findings indicate the existence of an organized network involving several European Members of Parliament, allegedly acting at the behest of Armenia and in violation of international law. This network, purportedly supported by various non-governmental organizations, engaged in operations of influence peddling.

François Rochebloine and René Rouquet with Bako Sahakyan in occupied Karabakh, 2016

René Rouquet, the President of the French-Armenian Friendship socialist parliamentary group, and François Rochebloine, presiding over the “France-Karabakh” Circle, emerge prominently in this report. Rochebloine has notably organized “solidarity” trips to the Karabakh region, previously occupied by Armenia. The two men have engaged with Bako Sahakian and Ashot Ghoulyan, the former self-proclaimed “presidents” of the now-defunct “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” and its illegitimate “parliament,” respectively.

François Rochebloine and René Rouquet welcomed by Ashot Goulyan in occupied Karabakh, 2016

Their concerted efforts aimed to secure recognition of “Nagorno-Karabakh’s” political status by the French authorities and population, despite clear opposition from international law and resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The report highlights instances such as the meeting on May 24, 2016, where Sahakyan received Rochebloine and Rouquet in Karabakh, in violation of both Azerbaijani and international law. The discussions focused on developing ties between the former and illegal “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” and French parliaments, along with engagement with public and political circles.

François Rochebloine and René Rouquet next to Armenian separatists in occupied Karabakh, 2016

This not only gives rise to concerns regarding the influence French MPs wielded in shaping perceptions and actions related to the former Karabakh conflict, potentially compromising diplomatic efforts and aligning with a narrative that contradicts established international norms, but it also unveils the deep-seated roots of a biased and anti-Azerbaijan approach. It’s noteworthy that these two French MPs, involved in illegal visits to Azerbaijan’s then-occupied territories, were concurrently part of the French parliamentary delegation to PACE.

Intriguingly, the same report delves into the involvement of Frank Schwabe, a member of PACE since 2011 and currently heading the German delegation to PACE. Notably, Schwabe was the one advocating for the denial of the Azerbaijani delegation’s credentials. In his interview with BBC Azerbaijan, Schwabe asserted that Azerbaijan consciously chose not to invite the Council of Europe (CoE) to monitor the forthcoming snap elections, opting for the OSCE instead. He emphasized that this decision is not solely at the discretion of Azerbaijan; official Baku lacks the authority to selectively choose one organization over another. Additionally, Schwabe raised concerns about instances of alleged bribery associated with monitoring missions during the 2015 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. He speculated that Azerbaijan’s hesitance to involve the CoE might stem from an expectation of severe criticism, with a preference for a more favorable evaluation from the OSCE.

Frank Schwabe expressed dissatisfaction with the OSCE’s acceptance of the invitation and urged the organization to either jointly monitor the February 7 elections with the CoE or refrain from involvement altogether. When questioned by BBC Azerbaijan about whether he communicated his concerns to the OSCE, Schwabe confirmed that he had. However, he noted that the OSCE is currently under considerable pressure from Azerbaijan due to impending October discussions on the organization’s future, during which Azerbaijan’s support will be crucial. Schwabe alleged that while Azerbaijan is applying pressure to the OSCE, it remains challenging to exert similar influence on the CoE.

In response to Schwabe’s allegations, it is important to emphasize that Azerbaijan’s invitation to the OSCE ODIHR/OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for election observation reflects the country’s dedication to conducting transparent elections in accordance with its legislation. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) serves as an “autonomous institution” with established election standards. Any assertion that ODIHR provides “favorable evaluations” by default, as suggested by Schwabe, reveals a misunderstanding of ODIHR’s activities.

Bujar Osmani (left) and Jeyhun Bayramov (right) in Baku, 2023

Contrary to the allegations, Azerbaijan actively contributes to the OSCE, supporting the extension of terms for all top heads of institutions. Foreign Minister Bayramov, during the Ministerial Council meeting in Skopje in December 2023, reiterated Azerbaijan’s “readiness for constructive engagement within the OSCE to overcome the existing challenges to its functionality and efficiency.”

In the interview, Schwabe was also questioned about the Council of Europe’s stance on Armenia’s military aggression against Azerbaijan spanning over 30 years. He clarified that the Council avoids discussions on territorial ownership, focusing strictly on monitoring human rights.

Azerbaijan had sought the Council’s assistance for nearly three decades regarding refugees and internally displaced persons, but the Council consistently claimed a lack of mandate for such matters, refraining from engagement.

With Azerbaijan’s territorial restoration, the Council appears to have found a mandate under the guise of humanitarian issues. This perceived shift has led to concerns about unwarranted interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs and territory, prompting reflections on potential double standards in the Council’s approach to Azerbaijan’s challenges, especially considering its previous reluctance to address these issues before territorial restoration.

Samad Seyidov MP, who chairs the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE, highlighted the history of a committee on Karabakh established after the adoption of Resolution 1416 during the 2005 assembly. Late Lord Russell Johnston led this Subcommittee on Karabakh, which included heads of the delegations from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group were also expected to participate. Unfortunately, obstruction from the Armenian delegation plagued the subcommittee from its inception. The passing of Lord Russell Johnston in 2008 resulted in a halt to its activities, favoring the Armenian delegation.

Azerbaijani Delegation Addresses Council of Europe Before Suspending Participation in PACE

In 2011, the committee resumed its work at the initiative of Assembly President Mavlut Cavusoglu. However, in 2012, French Assembly President Jean-Claude Mignon, influenced by Armenian interests, pushed for its definitive closure. Despite the bureau’s decision, the Armenian delegation ignored it, abstained from participating in the committee’s work, actively sabotaged its proceedings, and was never condemned by the Assembly for failing its obligations.

Surprisingly, after the liberation of Azerbaijani territories, discussions on the Karabakh issue became a recurring theme at almost every assembly session. Ironically, some deputies who argued against discussing the conflict persistently brought it up during each session, reflecting a clear pro-Armenian stance. Seyidov concludes by stating that these individuals not only disregarded discussions on the rights of Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons during the occupation but also focused openly on discussing the rights of Armenians in the separatist enclave and their fate after leaving Azerbaijan.

Farhad Mammadov, head of the Centre for South Caucasus Studies, pointed out in an interview with the YouTube Channel Новости Кавказа (GSAC) that PACE was previously the most pro-Russian structure in all of Europe, with many deputies seemingly carrying price tags indicating their potential purchasability. He points out that during critical moments, such as discussions about the Southern Gas Corridor and the establishment of relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union, PACE consistently posed challenges. This was perceived as aligned with Russia’s objective to distance post-Soviet countries from Europe and European structures. Mammadov highlights instances where coalitions of NGOs, triggered by seemingly trivial matters like 300 olive trees in Italy, launched extensive campaigns against the Southern Gas Corridor and found support within PACE.

Mammadov implies that Azerbaijan navigated these challenges by aligning with the anticipated expectations of European MPs. He concludes by underscoring the principle that one shouldn’t sell if they wish not to be bought, thereby shifting the scrutiny to the seller’s principles.

It appears that PACE, particularly Frank Schwabe, the head of the German Parliamentary delegation to PACE, might have certain motives at play, especially considering Schwabe’s persistent and seemingly obsessive concerns about Azerbaijan.

Erkin Gadirli, an MP and member of the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE, expressed his concerns to the YouTube Channel Musavat TV regarding the recent resolution. He argued that removing some points from the resolution, specifically those he deemed as “shameless slander,” such as alleged ethnic cleansing and the purported blockade of the Lachin road, would leave longstanding issues that have been discussed for years. Gadirli suggested that if these issues were significant enough to question the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation or consider excluding Azerbaijan from the organization, PACE could have done so in previous years. The timing of the decision, in his view, raises questions about the motives behind it.

Gadirli pointed out that there are individuals within the organization who may be struggling to accept Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day Patriotic War, particularly left-wing politicians. He highlighted PACE’s discontent with Azerbaijan’s decision to invite the OSCE, rather than PACE, to monitor the snap elections in February. Gadirli emphasized the differences between PACE and OSCE monitoring approaches, stating that PACE’s delegation is small and arrives just a week before the elections, while OSCE conducts more thorough monitoring, starting months in advance. Despite the detailed reports by OSCE, Gadirli suggested that PACE’s dissatisfaction with not being chosen indicates a lack of trust in the OSCE’s evaluations.

Moreover, Gadirli claimed that until the last day, the Azerbaijani delegation was approached with the option to revoke the decision if Azerbaijan changed its mind and invited PACE to monitor the elections. However, he attributed Azerbaijan’s reluctance to invite PACE to the organization’s previous resolution against Azerbaijan, adopted after the country’s full restoration of its territorial integrity and sovereignty in September 2023. This resolution, according to Gadirli, was filled with slander and falsehoods, influencing Azerbaijan’s decision regarding PACE’s involvement in monitoring the elections.

Oleksii Goncharenko at PACE

In an exclusive interview with Azerbaijan’s CBC channel, Oleksii Goncharenko, a member of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation to PACE, voiced his support for Azerbaijan and revealed that he did not vote against the ratification of Azerbaijan’s powers. Goncharenko emphasized the crucial moment Azerbaijan is facing, having restored its territorial integrity and moving towards a peace treaty with Armenia. He stressed the global significance of achieving peace in the South Caucasus.

According to Goncharenko, the Council of Europe can play a constructive role by fostering collaboration when both Azerbaijan and Armenia are active members. He expressed concern about the potential hindrance to dialogue when one country suspends its work while the other continues. Goncharenko reiterated that his position in support of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has remained consistent, and he has been transparent about it. He acknowledged that while some may hold different views or be dissatisfied with the current situation, it is their problem.

Furthermore, Goncharenko shared that he conveyed to his Armenian colleagues that, from his perspective, it is in Armenia’s interests for Azerbaijan to be a member of the Council of Europe. He highlighted the importance of having a shared platform for dialogue. Notably, Ukraine did not cast a single vote in favor of the resolution, placing it among the countries that did not support this measure.

Undoubtedly, another significant observation is that the entire Armenian delegation to PACE voted in favor of the resolution challenging the credentials of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary delegation. As per Samad Sayidov, this move deals a considerable blow to the peace process in the region. The Parliamentary Assembly had the potential to serve as a prime platform for parliamentary diplomacy between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Over the course of 23 years, both delegations have actively participated in its work, fostering familiarity and offering the opportunity for daily communication with the top parliamentary leadership of both countries. All of these interactions could have been leveraged to constructively build trust measures between parliamentarians and the peoples of both nations. Unfortunately, all these opportunities have now been nullified. Sayidov sees this as a major misstep by the Armenian delegation in the assembly, once again succumbing to becoming pawns in the hands of European politicians who seem to adhere to the old adage: divide and conquer.

Speaking of the Armenian parliamentary delegation to PACE, Ruben Rubinyan, Vice President of the National Assembly of Armenia and a member of the Armenian delegation to PACE, addressed the issue of the Azerbaijani delegation’s credentials not being ratified. During an interview with Petros Ghazaryan on the air of the public TV company on January 30th, Rubinyan expressed his views on “why Azerbaijan’s actions have not been judged adequately by Europe and the international community.” According to Rubinyan, “there are several reasons for this perceived lack of judgment.” In his opinion, “international partners failed to grasp the scale of Azerbaijan’s aggressiveness and its disregard for the international order.” Rubinyan suggests, “it took certain events to unfold for many to realize the true nature of Azerbaijan’s actions.”

Ruben Rubinyan

Such statements from Rubinyan, coupled with his role as one of the MPs who voted in favor of the recent anti-Azerbaijan resolution, not only deal a blow to the peace process but also indicate a discrepancy between Armenia’s verbal recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and its actions. Moreover, Rubinyan’s remarks can be seen as a tacit acknowledgment that Armenia played a significant role in initiating the resolution against Azerbaijan.

In a recent development, His Holiness the Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church and Catholicos of All Armenians, Garegin II, articulated territorial claims against Azerbaijan during his message on Army Day, delivered on January 28th. In his address, he remarked, “Since the time of the Artsakh movement, the Armenian regular army was formed by a union of volunteer squads and detachments of conscripts, who for more than three decades fought with unprecedented acts of bravery during the Artsakh wars and military operations.” The First Hierarch of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church underscored, “in the difficult situation that has developed in our region, the comprehensive strengthening of the Armenian army is of paramount importance, and in order to repel the catastrophic tragedies, the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, we must support our army with all our might.”

This statement, apart from referencing an illegal entity that formerly existed on the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, subsequently dismantled and dissolved on January 1, 2024, as a result of an anti-terror operation carried out by Azerbaijan in September 2023, appears to convey an ongoing territorial claim against Azerbaijan.

Armenia, along with certain Western entities, interprets Azerbaijan’s use of toponyms like West Azerbaijan, East Zangezur, and Iravan as a territorial claim to Armenia. Contrarily, Azerbaijan consistently asserts at all levels and forums that it harbors no such territorial ambitions. This raises a pertinent question: why doesn’t the same scrutiny apply when Armenia disregards toponyms in Azerbaijan? Interestingly, some Western actors persist in using non-existent toponyms like “Stepanakert” and “Artsakh” themselves. By their own logic, it suggests that Armenia still harbors territorial claims against Azerbaijan, with certain Western actors seemingly supportive of such assertions. The principle of mutual respect becomes crucial; one must acknowledge the importance of respecting others before demanding it for oneself. It’s imperative not to forget the historical context of occupation and the Azerbaijani lands that were occupied for almost 30 years. In a recent interview, Alen Simonyan, Chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, conceded that Azerbaijan’s current rhetoric mirrors Armenia’s rhetoric over the past 30 years. While Simonyan grasps this dynamic, PACE appears reluctant to embrace the same understanding.

Azerbaijani refugees, forcibly displaced from their homes by Armenia’s occupying forces during the first Karabakh War

Returning to the discourse on foreign actors’ roles or the Armenia-Azerbaijan post-conflict landscape, according to Armenian media reports, Anahit Filipposyan, Vice-President for Strategy and Development at APRI Armenia, noted during her presentation on RA-EU relations that, “During our interviews with Europeans, they emphasized that the EU does not want to take anyone’s place. It is clear and, moreover, they said that the development of EU-Armenian relations is aimed at further developing Armenia against Azerbaijan.” Reports suggest that these interviews occurred in Yerevan and Brussels, involving various stakeholders such as EU staff, diplomats, European diplomats in Yerevan, and members of the Brussels and EU political community.

Commenting on this situation, Samad Sayidov observed a paradoxical trend within European structures. Instead of seeking common ground among the South Caucasus states — Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan — they appear to emphasize points of contention that could foster division. This approach became apparent in the case of Georgia, where European structures insisted on exporting Georgian realities to Azerbaijan, potentially undermining the delicate historical connections between these neighboring states. Interestingly, it was Azerbaijan, not European structures, that provided significant assistance to Georgia during its war, preventing the loss of its sovereignty.

Now, a similar scenario is playing out with Armenia. Rather than contributing to the establishment of trust-building measures between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the post-war period, European structures, exemplified by resolutions from the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, seem to be exacerbating tensions between the two nations. Despite these challenges, Samad Sayidov expresses confidence that, in the end, Azerbaijan will play a role in preserving Armenia’s sovereignty.

He suggests that this European policy might not be driven by a genuine interest in assisting the region but rather reflects an attempt to exert direct influence, effectively managing and directing the region’s development against other states.

Another notable example involves Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CoE), Dunja Mijatović. Her report on the outcomes of the visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan from October 16–23 of the previous year is emblematic of a skewed perspective.

Dunja Mijatović

Mijatović’s report singularly focused on one ethnic group, presenting information in a distorted manner, deliberately sidestepping the plight of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs. Omitted were any references to the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia, their challenges, or the crucial meeting with them. This omission goes beyond a mere oversight; it signifies a blatant case of bias, ethnic, and religious discrimination. It’s imperative to emphasize that concerns were swiftly voiced right after the Council of Europe’s press release on October 26, 2023, about Mijatović’s visit to the region, which failed to acknowledge almost one million Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs. However, the persistence of a biased attitude towards Azerbaijan is unmistakable.

Refugee camp in Azerbaijan, Beylagan — one of many across the country.

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, demonstrated a one-sided and anti-Azerbaijan stance in his statement on January 22. Borrell expressed solidarity with France, stating, “We expressed solidarity with France — their diplomats have been expelled — and we agreed that Azerbaijan needs to return to substantive peace and normalization talks with Armenia.” This expression of solidarity appears to justify the actions of expelled French diplomats in Azerbaijan, intervening in the ongoing legal investigation process. Such a biased statement, while ignoring baseless measures against Azerbaijan’s diplomats in France, reveals the negative influence of certain countries on this institution, openly neglecting diplomatic conduct rules and guidelines and refusing to investigate the case.

Borrell further remarked that “the latest territorial claims by President Aliyev are very concerning. And any violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity will be unacceptable and will have severe consequences for our relations with Azerbaijan.” We have previously discussed the manipulation of historical toponyms into territorial claims in this article. Let’s revisit another point discussed earlier — the position of Ukrainian MP Goncharenko.

On the same day, Borrell highlighted that “Ukraine is and remains a top priority for us in front of the Russian continued aggression against Ukraine, which is also a threat to security in Europe.” These two statements made within a single briefing underscore the grave hypocrisy and double standards. It’s important to remind Josep Borrell, who prioritizes Armenian territorial integrity, that it is the Armenian constitution that has territorial claims against Azerbaijan. It was the Decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia of 1992 on the subjectivity and Armenian essence of “Artsakh” adopted on July 8, 1992, which still states “to consistently support the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the protection of the rights of its population” and “to consider unacceptable for the Republic of Armenia any international or internal document in which the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic will be mentioned as part of Azerbaijan.”

Decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia of 1992 on the subjectivity and Armenian essence of “Artsakh”

The lingering question persists: who truly disrupts the prospects of peace? Is it Armenia, utilizing the time gained to feign peaceful intentions while secretly bolstering its military and pursuing revanchist goals? Or are there anti-Azerbaijan powers in the West manipulating Armenia as a pawn in their broader game against Azerbaijan? Only time will unveil the answer, but one certainty prevails: Azerbaijan remains resolute, refusing to backtrack from the path it embarked upon against those who occupied its lands, leaving its people as refugees and IDPs for three decades, with certain external forces allowing this situation to endure. Azerbaijan is poised for peace, a fact underscored by its initiation of the peace process in 2020 immediately after the Second Karabakh War. However, peace cannot be imposed; it must arise from a genuine desire for harmony, a sentiment evidently shared by Azerbaijan.