Chatham House: TRIPP’s success hinges on backing from Türkiye and EU

The Chatham House article analyses the outcomes of the recent summit in Washington between Azerbaijan, Armenia and US President Donald Trump, focusing on its implications for the peace process in the South Caucasus. It outlines two main developments: the initialling of a bilateral treaty text on normalisation and the agreement to establish the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) to address connectivity issues. While these initiatives could reduce the role of Russian mediation, the commentary notes that their implementation will depend on domestic political developments, regional responses, and sustained international engagement to maintain momentum towards more stable relations.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process has entered a new phase following a high-profile White House summit between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump, though analysts warn that entrenched political narratives and regional rivalries could stall progress.

Meeting in Washington on August 8, the leaders initialled a 17-article treaty governing the normalisation of relations — the culmination of bilateral talks since 2023. While the text reaffirms Soviet-era borders, renounces territorial claims and calls for the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, it stops short of a formal peace treaty.

One major Azerbaijani precondition was resolved at the summit: a joint request to end the 1990s mediation framework. However, another remains — Baku’s demand that Armenia amend its constitution to remove indirect references to unification with Mountainous Karabakh. That requirement is likely to hinge on a contentious 2026 referendum, with Pashinyan’s political survival tied to its success.

A second, more American-driven outcome was the launch of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a rebranded version of the long-disputed Zangezur corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia.

The TRIPP, structured as a US–Armenia joint venture under long-term leases to American companies, aims to preserve Armenian sovereignty while providing “unimpeded” Azerbaijani access. Reciprocal transit rights for Armenia through Azerbaijani territory were also agreed, though details remain vague.

“The TRIPP embodies the one common position that Armenia and Azerbaijan have shared over the last 35 years: reluctance to see a Russian monopoly on managing the conflict between them,” said Laurence Broers, Associate Fellow at Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme.

The initiative sidelines Russian oversight of the route as set out in the 2020 Moscow-brokered ceasefire, prompting predictable displeasure in Moscow. Russia is expected to resist, potentially through pressure on Azerbaijani energy exports, Armenia’s trade in the Eurasian Economic Union or diaspora communities in Russia.

Iran, with fewer levers of influence, has voiced concern over a sustained US presence along its border, despite the plan’s alignment with Tehran’s preference for respecting international frontiers.

The TRIPP’s success will depend on Washington maintaining focus and securing backing from other powers, including Türkiye — which is pursuing its own normalisation with Armenia — and the European Union. Without a broad coalition, geopolitical branding risks turning the route into a short-lived experiment.

Domestically, both governments face challenges in reframing deeply ingrained conflict narratives. The treaty’s Article 15 forecloses legal action in international courts within a month of signature, a move critics see as a “pact of forgetting” that trades justice for economic promises.

This could fuel opposition in Armenia, where many view the concessions as undermining national dignity. In Azerbaijan, where military victory since 2020 has bolstered the leadership’s legitimacy, nationalist rhetoric describing Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” remains at odds with the treaty’s spirit. Whether such discourse subsides will be a key test of Baku’s commitment.

Pragmatists argue that transitional justice mechanisms are unrealistic for now, but tens of thousands displaced over four decades may see themselves excluded from the peace dividends. As Broers cautions, de-securitising Armenia–Azerbaijan relations “will depend more on domestic political shifts away from ingrained conflict narratives” than on the optics of any summit.