Kim Jong Un frames US as global instability threat, hints at conditional dialogue

Kim Jong Un opened the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress in Pyongyang by outlining North Korea’s foreign and security priorities and sharply criticising the U.S. as a persistent source of global instability.

According to Kim, Washington pursues unilateral hegemony, undermines sovereignty, and escalates regional tensions through military alliances and aggressive posturing in the Asia-Pacific, the Korean Central News Agency reports.

Against this backdrop, Kim reaffirmed the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal as permanent and non-negotiable, enshrined in law and the constitution. He highlighted the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war, neutralising U.S.-led threats, and maintaining strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula.

The congress showcased recent advancements—including expanded warhead stockpiles, upgraded delivery systems such as submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs, AI-integrated unmanned platforms, electronic warfare capabilities, and reconnaissance satellites—and announced ambitious five-year plans to further modernise and diversify the military arsenal.

While maintaining a firm stance on nuclear deterrence, Kim offered a narrow window for dialogue, stating that “if the U.S. respects the present position of our state specified in the Constitution of the DPRK and withdraws its hostile policy toward the DPRK, there is no reason why we cannot get on well with the U.S.”

This conditional opening signals a willingness for pragmatic engagement, even as Pyongyang rejects previous denuclearisation-for-relief frameworks, designates South Korea as a principal enemy, and warns of proportional retaliation against perceived provocations.

The overall message suggests that Pyongyang sees limited prospects for near-term diplomacy without a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. In the meantime, North Korea plans to deepen relations with anti-imperialist states, rely on its self-reliant defence posture, and maintain constant readiness.

For Washington, the Congress underscores that sanctions or pressure alone are unlikely to change North Korea’s course, and meaningful engagement would require at least tacit acknowledgement of a nuclear-armed DPRK.

In sum, the Ninth Party Congress solidifies a strategy of entrenched deterrence paired with conditional, interest-based pragmatism toward the United States. Unless American policy undergoes a significant reorientation, the coming years are likely to feature continued military modernization, periodic demonstrations or tests, and a restrained baseline for bilateral diplomacy.

By Aghakazim Guliyev