Tectonic shift in Eurasian geopolitical arena loosens Russia's tight grip An analysis by Foreign Affairs

Russia’s full-scale military assault on Ukraine in 2022 shocked many of its post-Soviet neighbours and confirmed long-standing fears of Moscow’s threat to their sovereignty. Yet the war has also created an opportunity: as the Kremlin’s attention and resources remain tied up in Ukraine, countries across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia have moved to reduce their dependence on Russia, deepen regional cooperation, and pursue new international partnerships.

Many of these governments have refrained from directly criticising Russia’s aggression but are actively strengthening their independence, as an article published by Foreign Affairs on this tectonic geopolitical in the wider region lays bare.

Facing delays in promised Russian weapons deliveries, they’ve turned to alternative suppliers like China, Türkiye, Israel, India, and Pakistan. Simultaneously, as Moscow has pulled troops and equipment from its bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia, local governments have begun resolving regional conflicts without Russian interference.

Eurasia through Russia’s lenses

Although this shift has emboldened post-Soviet countries, the article cautions that history suggests that the Kremlin could go to extreme lengths to preserve its grip on the region. Russia still views Ukraine and Belarus as core to its security, but it also seeks dominance over Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. According to the article's author, it maintains a more distant postimperial regard toward the remainder of Central Asia for now.

The 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept revived the term “near abroad,” citing “centuries-old traditions of joint statehood, deep interdependence … a common language, and close cultures” to justify its hold over these nations. The article puts forward its prediction that Moscow is likely to increase efforts to reassert dominance—pressuring countries to join Russian-led institutions, mimic its laws, accept economic dependence, and host its troops and intelligence assets once the war in Ukraine abates.

Power vacuum

As Russia shifted focus to Ukraine, a vacuum formed in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In 2022, conflicts flared between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moscow, usually the key broker in such disputes, was preoccupied with pulling forces out of both the Caucasus and Central Asia to boost its frontlines in Ukraine. As a result, Kyrgyz-Tajik clashes escalated, killing over 100 people and displacing more than 10,000.

Yet, Moscow’s absence later enabled real progress as the two governments reached a border settlement on the disputes in the Fergana Valley. The agreement led to the first summit of leaders from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, held in 2025 in Tajikistan, deliberately without Russia.

In the South Caucasus, the conflict over “Nagorno-Karabakh” (ed: a Soviet-era general term describing a wide area of the Azerbaijani regions that fell under Armenian military occupation. This geographic name has not existed in the Azerbaijani legislation, with the wider territory that has been liberated from the illegal occupation is administered as several separate administrative provinces) also moved toward resolution.

Baku and Yerevan began the difficult process of making peace following several consecutive years of military clashes, including the 44-Day War that led to the expulsion of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territories as well as tensions in 2023 that were followed by Azerbaijan re-establishing control over areas where Russian peacekeepers were stationed, including the strategically and culturally key city of Khankendi.

Upon the advance of Azerbaijani forces, the leaders of the Armenian separatist movement agreed to dissolve its structures and give up their claim on these territories. Following that historic turn of events, the vast majority of the local Armenian population that mostly resided in these areas throughout the years of the illegal military occupation abandoned the territories and relocated to Armenia.

With the separatist movement dismantled, Russian peacekeepers withdrew, and Baku and Yerevan began formal peace talks. In March 2025, they announced a draft treaty to normalise relations and remove all foreign forces.

While the deal is not yet final, it reflects real progress. Notably, these talks—like those between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—proceeded without Russian mediation. In order to better visualise the Russian position on those disputes, the Foreign Policy article cites a long-running anecdote, which says that “in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the side Russia always supported was the conflict’s.”

With Moscow sidelined, these post-Soviet states have been able to assert greater agency, chosen cooperation, and found themselves capable of resolving their disputes themselves.

Other Powers Step In

Russia’s distraction has invited new players into its domain in those regions. These countries aren’t actively balancing against Moscow but are increasingly looking beyond it.

Armenia, for instance, has sought to end its reliance on Russian weapons by buying new systems from France and India (the latter chosen, in part, to counterbalance Pakistani support for Azerbaijan), having spent $1.5 billion on Indian arms, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE are investing in green energy and agriculture in Azerbaijan, and real estate across the region. 

The EU became Central Asia’s largest source of foreign investment in 2022 with its first dedicated regional strategy.

The most prominent non-Russian player in the region is China, which has grown particularly influential in Central Asia. Its trade with the region rose from $89.4 billion in 2023 to $94.8 billion in 2024—more than double that with Russia.

Chinese projects include pipelines from Turkmenistan, a railway linking Xinjiang to Uzbekistan, and a deep-sea port in Anaklia, Georgia. Chinese automakers also dominate Central Asia’s EV market.

Security ties are also expanding. China’s paramilitary forces operate in Tajikistan near the Afghan border, and it supplies weapons and air defence systems across the region. Uzbekistan is reportedly close to acquiring Chinese-Pakistani fighter jets.

Though Washington may worry about Chinese influence replacing Russian, Beijing’s presence offers protection from Moscow’s aggression. Anaklia, for example, enhances Georgia’s access to global trade while limiting dependence on Russian routes.

And though China is aligned with Russia on some issues, "Beijing has made clear that it opposes Russian activities that could disrupt its economic interests, including threats to a trading partner’s sovereignty and territorial integrity."

Türkiye has also emerged as a regional power. A NATO member, Ankara has expanded its influence through the Organisation of Turkic States, originally founded to bolster cultural ties, which now has moved to promote energy and transit cooperation.

"Turkish support in modernising Azerbaijan’s army was instrumental in its defeat of the (nominally) Russian-backed Armenia in both 2020 and 2023. Azerbaijan’s crushing victories garnered substantial attention across the region. They offered proof that a Soviet-legacy military could both be remade along Western lines and afterwards win a war. "

The increased interest paid to the Turkish defence industry has yielded results: All Central Asian states except Tajikistan now operate Turkish drones, with Kazakhstan now even building a drone plant with renowned Turkish Baykar.

Security cooperation is expanding further, including joint exercises and training. Even Armenia, historically deeply at odds with Türkiye, is reportedly considering military ties with Ankara if peace with Azerbaijan holds. A Turkish-Armenian thaw could unlock investment and further marginalize Moscow—explaining recent Kremlin friction with both Yerevan and Baku.

Emerging new trade routes bypassing Northern neighbour

Energy and trade infrastructure are also reshaping the region. Like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines of the 2000s, new projects boost transit revenue and market access. As the article points out, much of the initiative for building new infrastructure does come from countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia themselves.

After Moscow repeatedly interfered with shipments of Kazakh oil through the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline to signal displeasure with Astana’s criticism of the invasion of Ukraine, it recalls that Kazakhstan started sending more of the oil it delivers to Europe through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, bypassing Russia. In March 2024, Kazakhstan signed a new agreement with Azerbaijan to further expand deliveries via the pipeline.

Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas has created opportunity. In 2022, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President Aliyev agreed to double Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU. Turkmenistan is set to supply gas through Azerbaijan and Türkiye, while European companies explore green energy potential in the region.

"The most important new transit initiative may be the Middle Corridor, a route inaugurated in 2013 by transportation companies from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan that connects China to Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus," the article highlights.

It long lagged behind Russia’s Northern Corridor, but sanctions and corporate exits from Russia reversed that trend. According to information cited from the Asian Development Bank, the number of Chinese container trains using the Middle Corridor grew 33-fold between 2023 and 2024, while Caspian ports saw a 21% cargo increase.

Despite all those developments unprecedented for the region, the article acknowledges that Russia will remain influential in its former empire not least due to geography, shared history, and elite connections.

Most regional leaders still value ties with Moscow. In some cases, Russia even benefits from new projects, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor linking it to the Indian Ocean via Azerbaijan and Iran.

Yet increasingly, regional states are diversifying their partnerships. Even countries like Kazakhstan—which awarded a nuclear plant contract to Russia’s Rosatom—are hedging their bets. As the Foreign Policy article notes, rather than choosing sides in the Russia-West divide, these nations are capitalising on the long-suppressed moment which took root thanks to the Kremlin’s diminished attention.

By Nazrin Sadigova