Europe’s naval blind spot: Red Sea crisis exposes EU’s maritime deficit

In the geopolitical tug-of-war playing out in the Red Sea, Europe had a rare opportunity to assert independent military relevance—without riding on Washington’s coattails. Yet, as The Economist points out, Operation Aspides, the EU’s “purely defensive” naval mission launched in February 2024, has proven underwhelming in the face of persistent attacks by Yemen’s Houthi militia. The failure to respond effectively to the July assaults on two merchant ships, Magic Seas and Eternity C, has laid bare the serious deficiencies in Europe’s naval capabilities and strategic coordination.

Despite the ambitious mandate to secure maritime lanes in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and beyond, Operation Aspides suffers from severe resource constraints. At the time of the July attacks, the mission had only two frigates and a single helicopter patrolling a vast expanse of water. Requests for assistance went unanswered—not because of negligence, but because there were simply no EU assets nearby. That fragility stems from years of frugal defence spending by EU member states, many of whom have deprioritised maritime strength in favour of political and economic integration.

The budget behind Aspides underscores the imbalance. At just €17 million for a year’s operations, it pales in comparison to America’s muscle: the U.S. spent ten times that amount simply replenishing missile stocks during Operation Prosperity Guardian in late 2023. The comparison is starker when considering naval hardware. While the U.S. Navy maintains 11 aircraft carriers, NATO-aligned EU members collectively field just three—highlighting Europe’s chronic underinvestment in long-range maritime power projection.

Beyond hardware, institutional sluggishness adds another layer of dysfunction. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, under which Aspides operates, requires consensus from all 27 member states to continue or modify missions. That unanimity is difficult to achieve quickly in moments of crisis, rendering the bloc slow to act and overly cautious in deploying force.

The result is a naval strategy shaped more by political caution than military necessity. Even France and Italy, two of the EU’s most capable naval powers, are tied up demonstrating presence in the Indo-Pacific and Black Sea, limiting their ability to reinforce the Red Sea. Future naval expansion—such as France’s next-generation aircraft carrier, due in 2038—is too distant to affect today’s crises.

Still, Europe’s shipping continues. Many cargo operators now face a stark choice: take the longer, more expensive route around Africa, or risk the Houthi-infested Red Sea, where war-risk insurance premiums have more than tripled. Either option is costly, and neither addresses the vulnerability of Europe’s sea lanes.

Crucially, as The Economist notes, this crisis is not just about resource shortages. Even a fleet of carriers would need escorts and integrated systems to operate safely in high-threat environments. And firepower may not even offer lasting deterrence: American strikes on Houthi positions have failed to eliminate the threat. The real solution may lie in a broader diplomatic effort to resolve the Yemen conflict and stabilise the region.

Still, the precedent set by the Houthis is alarming. Their asymmetric attacks have shown how small actors can deliver outsized disruption at vital chokepoints. As maritime historian Salvatore Mercogliano warns, “You can get disproportionate results with very little resources.” If others mimic the Houthis’ model, Europe’s inability—or unwillingness—to project naval power may soon come at a much steeper cost.

By Vugar Khalilov