OSCE Minsk Group's flawed peace efforts From diplomatic deadlock to war

A recent article by The University of Sheffield Politics Society newspaper provides an in-depth analysis of the OSCE Minsk Group’s mediation efforts in the Karabakh conflict, ultimately revealing its shortcomings and the broader implications for international conflict resolution. Caliber.Az analyzes the key points of the article for its readers.

The piece explores the historical context of the dispute, the failures of the Minsk Group, and the path to war, culminating in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. This analysis highlights not only the limitations of the Minsk Group but also the critical lessons for future peace processes.

Introduction

The Karabakh conflict has been one of the most persistent and contentious geopolitical disputes in the Caucasus. Over the years, international mediation efforts, particularly through the OSCE Minsk Group, attempted to bring about a peaceful resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Established in 1992, the Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States, aimed to facilitate dialogue and prevent escalation. However, the group’s failure to achieve meaningful progress over nearly three decades culminated in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. This article explores the reasons behind the Minsk Group's ineffectiveness and the broader implications for international conflict mediation.

The OSCE Minsk Group: Mandate and structure

To understand the Minsk Group’s failures, it is crucial to examine its mandate and structure. Created with the goal of mediating a peaceful resolution, the Minsk Group consisted of 11 participating states, with the co-chairs being Russia, France, and the United States. While it was tasked with facilitating ceasefire monitoring, diplomatic discussions, and proposing frameworks for peace, the group faced immediate challenges. Despite its extensive mandate, it lacked the authority to enforce agreements, a limitation that became increasingly evident as the conflict dragged on.

Failures of mediation: Key factors

Several factors contributed to the Minsk Group’s inability to resolve the Karabakh conflict effectively:

1. Lack of pressure and enforcement: The Minsk Group focused primarily on maintaining a fragile ceasefire rather than addressing the core issues of the conflict. Although some successes were recorded, such as the 1995 prisoner exchange, the group lacked the authority to compel Armenia to withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which was central to a lasting resolution.

2. Bias among mediators: A significant criticism of the Minsk Group, particularly from Azerbaijan, was the perception of bias. The influence of Armenian diasporas in key countries, notably France and the United States, raised questions about the impartiality of the mediators. Furthermore, the pro-Armenian rhetoric of French officials, including President Macron’s statements during the 44-day war in 2020, exacerbated these concerns and further eroded confidence in the Minsk Group’s neutrality.

3. Lack of inclusivity: The negotiation process was largely exclusive to state representatives, with little to no involvement from displaced persons or civil society organizations. This lack of broad-based representation undermined the legitimacy of the peace process and hindered the development of sustainable solutions.

4. Diplomatic stalemates and missed opportunities: Numerous summits, including the Madrid Principles and the 1996 Lisbon Summit’s peace proposals, failed to bring about substantial progress. Armenia’s repeated rejection of key agreements and the absence of mechanisms to enforce compliance led to repeated diplomatic failures, particularly as the issue of territorial withdrawal remained unresolved.

5. Geopolitical complications: The changing geopolitical landscape further complicated the Minsk Group’s efforts. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance, particularly in energy and its relationship with Türkiye, shifted the balance of power in the region. This geopolitical reality, alongside the increasing militarization of the conflict, made diplomacy seem less viable in comparison to military action.

The path to war: From diplomacy to conflict

The Minsk Group’s inability to resolve the Karabakh conflict set the stage for renewed hostilities. The failure to secure a lasting peace agreement, coupled with ongoing territorial occupation, led Azerbaijan to view military action as the only remaining option to reclaim its land. This sentiment became even clearer following Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s inflammatory statement in 2019, asserting that “Karabakh is Armenia.” In September 2020, the long-standing diplomatic deadlock erupted into the Second Karabakh War, which ended with Azerbaijan’s decisive victory and a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia.

The war’s outcome highlighted the Minsk Group’s diminishing role in mediating future negotiations. Despite a ceasefire agreement, the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism allowed the underlying issues to persist, leading to a situation where Azerbaijan’s military success ultimately supplanted the diplomatic efforts of the Minsk Group.

Post-war developments and current negotiations

Following the war, both countries focused on the demarcation and delimitation of borders. Azerbaijan pushed for the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor, which would provide unimpeded transit between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan. However, Armenia’s resistance to these terms added another layer of complexity to the negotiations. At the same time, the possibility of constitutional reforms in Armenia, as well as the continued increase in military purchases, especially from France and India, indicates that the peace process remains fragile.

Lessons for international mediation

The failure of the Minsk Group offers several lessons for future international mediation efforts:

1. Enforcement mechanisms are essential: Without the authority to enforce agreements, mediators will struggle to bring about meaningful change. For international bodies to have a real impact, they must possess the means to ensure compliance.

2. Impartiality is key: Perceived or real bias among mediators can undermine the entire process. Future mediation efforts must strive for impartiality to foster trust among all parties involved.

3. Inclusion of all stakeholders: A comprehensive peace process must involve all affected communities, not just the governments. This inclusivity strengthens the legitimacy and sustainability of any agreement.

4. Adaptability and proactivity: Diplomacy must be proactive, addressing tensions before they escalate into full-blown conflict. An adaptive approach that evolves with the situation on the ground is essential.

Conclusion

The Karabakh conflict highlights the limitations of international mediation when the necessary components for success—such as enforcement, impartiality, and adaptability—are lacking. The OSCE Minsk Group’s failure to resolve the dispute ultimately contributed to the conditions that led to war. Moving forward, international organizations must learn from these shortcomings to develop more effective approaches to conflict resolution. The role of the Minsk Group remains a point of contention, and as the region continues to evolve, it raises critical questions about the future of international peace mediation.

The article from The University of Sheffield Politics Society newspaper provides a thorough examination of these themes and underscores the importance of addressing these issues in future diplomatic efforts to prevent similar conflicts.