Pivot fatigue: How Washington’s Asia strategy lost its balance By Foreign Affairs – reviewed and analysed

The latest essay in Foreign Affairs delivers a blunt verdict: the U.S. “pivot to Asia” has failed—not because the logic was flawed, but because the United States never matched ambition with resources. What began in 2011 under Barack Obama as a sweeping strategic rebalance has, nearly fifteen years later, narrowed into a thin military line along the first island chain. The article argues that this drift has created a dangerous credibility gap—what Walter Lippmann once warned against—between commitments and power.

At its core, the pivot rested on three pillars: security, prosperity, and governance. Yet only the security pillar received sustained attention. Washington strengthened alliances with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea, and pledged to shift naval assets to the Indo-Pacific. But its economic vision collapsed. The demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership—abandoned after U.S. domestic political resistance—signaled to Asian partners that American trade leadership was unreliable. Successor initiatives lacked market access and strategic weight, leaving room for China’s economic gravity to dominate.

Governance fared no better. Efforts to promote democracy and human rights alienated several Southeast Asian governments, while more recent U.S. retreats from international norms—combined with protectionist measures and selective coercion—have damaged Washington’s credibility. The article underscores that favorability ratings have slipped across key regional states, not merely because of China’s rise but due to American inconsistency.

As the economic and governance pillars eroded, the security agenda became overburdened. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy reportedly narrowed priorities to defending the first island chain—Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines—effectively conceding much of mainland and maritime Southeast Asia to Beijing’s expanding influence. The article portrays this not as a deliberate grand strategy, but as an incremental retrenchment shaped by domestic division, competing global crises, and resource constraints.

Particularly striking is the discussion of South Asia. The once-promising strategic convergence with India appears strained, and mechanisms like the Quad risk stagnation. In Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, U.S. downgrading of development and climate engagement has pushed smaller states toward pragmatic accommodation with Beijing. The essay suggests that, absent robust economic engagement, even military deterrence becomes harder to sustain.

The article rejects a full retreat to the “second island chain” as catastrophic, arguing it would likely trigger nuclear proliferation in Japan or South Korea and embolden China to test new red lines. Instead, it sees retrenchment to the first island chain as the most realistic—if deeply imperfect—option. Even this narrower strategy, however, demands higher allied defense spending, deeper operational integration, and potentially uncomfortable conversations about nuclear sharing.

Ultimately, the Foreign Affairs piece frames the debate not as one between primacy and withdrawal, but between fantasy and feasibility. A comprehensive pivot is politically and economically unattainable; yet a half-executed one risks a failure of deterrence. The uncomfortable conclusion is that Washington must openly redefine its commitments, consult allies quietly but candidly, and align ends with means—even if that means accepting reduced influence.

By Vugar Khalilov