Saudi Kingdom’s return to Lebanon Riyadh seizes on post-ceasefire power shift

The ceasefire between Tel Aviv and Beirut, brokered in November 2024 after intense Israeli bombardment, has ushered in a new phase in Lebanon’s political crisis. While the war ended without a clear military victory for either side, the U.S. and its allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, saw an opportunity to exert political influence over Lebanon by leveraging its post-war vulnerabilities.

This marks a strategic shift in Riyadh’s approach with an article by The Cradle publication pointing out that The Saudi Kingdom seeks to regain its footing in Lebanon after years of disengagement.

The article recalls that Saudi Arabia moved swiftly to reassess its Lebanon strategy even before the ceasefire was formally in place. Oversight of Lebanon was transferred from the Saudi Royal Court, previously managed by top advisor Nizar al-Aloula, to the Foreign Ministry under Faisal bin Farhan, signaling a shift toward a more direct diplomatic engagement. Riyadh quickly reestablished ties with key Lebanese political factions and religious institutions in the country where both Sunni and Shia Muslims play a vital role. Riyadh also focused on political issues such as Lebanon’s dragging presidential election, which ended in January 2025 after almost 2 years of undecisive election rounds and the overall government formation.

Saudi Arabia’s return follows its abrupt disengagement in 2017, when it forced former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign during a TV appearance during his visit to Riyadh. This time, the article warns, the kingdom's support comes with strict conditions. Financial and political backing now depend on Lebanon taking concrete steps to curb Hezbollah’s influence, enforce international resolutions, and assert state control over all its territories. These demands represent a broader U.S.-Saudi strategy to weaken Hezbollah without direct military confrontation.

Lebanon under Saudi-American scrutiny

Lebanon is now being closely monitored by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., expected to demonstrate alignment with their agenda by pressuring Hezbollah and restricting its resources. This includes tightening financial controls to prevent reconstruction funds from reaching Hezbollah strongholds, such as Beirut’s southern suburb and south Lebanon, and severing regional ties with Iran-backed forces.

Journalist Maysam Rizk told the publication that Riyadh and Washington are using political and economic leverage rather than military action to weaken Hezbollah. “Saudi Arabia, alongside the US, views Lebanon as being on probation, monitoring how its government handles the resistance in the wake of the war. The goal isn’t just to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River, but to erode its influence nationwide under the guise of reforms.”

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, aware of these pressures, has actively sought to rebuild relations with Saudi Arabia. His first foreign visit after taking office on January 9 was to Riyadh, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) to reset bilateral ties. However, his efforts have yet to yield significant breakthroughs. Aoun’s second visit, scheduled after the ending of Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr) in April, is seen as another attempt to persuade Saudi Arabia to lift its current travel ban on Lebanon, resume trade, and open investment channels.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic goals in Lebanon

Saudi Arabia is positioning itself as Lebanon’s primary external benefactor, using financial incentives to shape political outcomes. Potential Saudi measures include pardoning Lebanese detainees, providing financial grants to the army, and contributing to reconstruction efforts. However, all aid is now conditional on Lebanon aligning with Riyadh’s policies.

Saudi Arabia is also competing with Qatar for influence in Lebanon, seeking to dismantle the political unity that emerged during the war. By securing key decision-making channels and aligning with Washington’s vision of a "Lebanon without resistance," Riyadh hopes to shift Lebanon’s internal dynamics in its favor. This approach relies on economic pressure rather than direct intervention, ensuring that Lebanon remains financially dependent on Persian Gulf states.

Political analyst Dr. Fouad Ibrahim argues that Saudi Arabia views Israel’s recent aggression as a strategic opening to weaken Hezbollah, particularly in the absence of key resistance leaders, including the late Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and several senior party officials. Additionally, the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government on December 8, 2024, has further emboldened Riyadh to press its advantage in Lebanon.

Normalization with Israel?

One of the most pressing concerns among political observers is whether Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy includes pressuring Lebanon into normalization with Israel. While this remains a long-term goal, Riyadh and Washington are consolidating control over Lebanon’s political, security, and financial institutions as a precursor to such a move.

During his interview to the publication, Dr. Ibrahim suggests that Saudi Arabia will leverage its financial and political resources to force Lebanon into compliance, including normalization and direct confrontation with Hezbollah. In exchange for economic aid and reconstruction assistance, Lebanon may be pressured to limit Hezbollah’s military capabilities and regional influence.

A key component of this strategy is reshaping Lebanon’s Sunni community, a crucial force in the country’s sectarian balance. By shifting Sunni political and religious institutions toward a more pro-Western and anti-resistance stance, Saudi Arabia hopes to alter Lebanon’s position on Palestine and broader regional conflicts. This would pave the way for deeper integration into the U.S.-led regional order, including potential diplomatic overtures toward Israel.

By Nazrin Sadigova