US to scale back defence role in Europe and South Korea New national strategy drafted by Hegseth says

According to the US National Security Strategy released on January 23, Washington intends to reduce its direct role in the defence of Europe and South Korea, shifting greater responsibility onto its allies.

The document, drafted under the leadership of Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, states that allied countries will now bear the primary burden for defending both the Korean Peninsula and European states. The strategy argues that this shift reflects the need for the United States and its partners to prepare for scenarios in which potential adversaries could act “in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theatres.”

The strategy sharply criticises past patterns of defence spending among US allies, noting that such risks would be less acute “if our allies and partners had spent recent decades investing adequately in their defences.” Instead, it says, with few exceptions, allies were often “content to allow the United States to defend them,” while they reduced military spending and prioritized domestic programs such as public welfare. The document adds that while underinvestment was ultimately the allies’ own choice, it was frequently encouraged by earlier US policymakers who mistakenly believed Washington benefited from allies that functioned more as dependents than as true partners.

“Fortunately, that is over now,” the strategy states. It emphasises that, as President Donald Trump has made clear, US allies and partners “must shoulder their fair share of the burden of our collective defence,” both because it is justified after decades of US defence subsidies and because it is strategically essential for all parties. The document adds that, since January 2025, US allies—particularly in Europe and South Korea—have begun to increase their contributions under President Trump’s leadership.

This emphasis on burden-sharing is described as a central pillar of the strategy, even as the Department of Defense prioritizes expanding the Joint Force and advocating higher defence spending to support that growth. The document stresses that US alliances and partnerships form a defensive perimeter around Eurasia and combine favourable geography with the economic strength of many of the world’s wealthiest nations. Collectively, it notes, this alliance network is far wealthier than all potential adversaries combined, meaning that if allies invest properly in their own defences—“consistent with the new global standard set at the Hague Summit”—they can together generate sufficient forces to deter opponents, even if threats emerge simultaneously in multiple regions.

Unlike the previous administration’s strategy, which placed strong emphasis on support for Taiwan, the new document makes no reference to the island.

By Tamilla Hasanova