What’s next for Assad’s hidden Captagon empire?

In its article, Foreign Policy highlights that as the conflict in Syria evolves, new challenges and opportunities are emerging for both the Assad regime and opposition forces. 

In early December, opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered Damascus, marking the culmination of a rapid offensive that seized significant territory in just over a week. The following day, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow by plane. His departure exposed a hidden industry within his regime: the Captagon trade.

Since the late 2010s, Assad's government had been deeply involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, an amphetamine-like stimulant. This illicit drug trade became a vital financial lifeline for Damascus during the Syrian civil war, helping to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The regime facilitated this operation through various security agencies, including the Fourth Armored Division and Air Force Intelligence Directorate, as well as through Assad's family and influential business allies.

With support from commercial, security, and political sectors, the Captagon trade thrived. Regime allies in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and industry played key roles in manufacturing, packaging, and smuggling the pills alongside legitimate goods, while security agencies ensured safe transport and protection from law enforcement. At the same time, government officials maintained a strong counternarcotics stance, publicly denying the existence of Captagon production in regime-controlled areas.

By the early 2020s, the Captagon trade had grown into a $10 billion industry, and the regime began using the drug as a political tool. By flooding conservative Gulf markets with Captagon and instigating clashes along Syria’s borders with Jordan, the Assad regime aimed to pressure its regional neighbors into engaging in normalization talks and lifting sanctions.

This strategy was most apparent in the spring and summer of 2023, when Captagon became a central issue in normalization talks between the Assad regime and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other regional stakeholders. The regime used the threat of flooding its neighbors’ borders with illicit drugs and provoking smuggling incidents with border guards as leverage to resist pressure on issues like human rights abuses, Syria’s ties with Iran, and broader regional relations.

Although Syria was readmitted to the Arab League, this approach ultimately failed, and Syria’s neighbors largely refrained from intervening on behalf of the Assad regime as opposition forces dismantled it. 

Now, opposition forces and local communities are uncovering evidence of the regime’s extensive involvement in the Captagon trade. They have searched palaces, villas, prisons, detention centers, military bases, and even luxury car garages linked to Assad and his associates, discovering vast stockpiles of Captagon pills and manufacturing equipment.

At the Mezzeh air base, a facility frequently used by the Assad family, the Republican Guard, and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, HTS forces uncovered and destroyed millions of Captagon pills. In Latakia, residents raided a car dealership owned by Munther al-Assad, a prominent member of the Assad family, and discovered thousands of pills, which were soon scattered across streets and sewers. In Douma, local residents and HTS forces identified one of the largest Captagon production sites: a former potato chip factory linked to Assad’s brother, Maher, and the regime-aligned businessman Amer Khiti.

Syria’s future could involve revitalizing its pharmaceutical sector. Prior to the war, the country was a regional leader in generic drug production. Reconstruction efforts should aim to restore Captagon labs and storage facilities to create jobs for displaced skilled workers and help Syria regain its status as a regional drug supplier. Redirecting the workforce and expertise previously tied to Captagon production into legitimate pharmaceutical manufacturing should be a key counternarcotics goal for the United States and its partners in Syria.

By Naila Huseynova