Could E3 “snapback” of Iranian sanctions have opposite effect? Defiant Tehran contemplates how to respond

A week after the European troika triggered the so-called “snapback” clause of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the 2015 nuclear deal mechanism that reimposes all UN sanctions on Iran within 30 days—the mood in Tehran is one of firm resolve mixed with strategic recalibration.

Iranian officials and lawmakers argue that the European signatories, which according to them have defaulted on their own JCPOA commitments after Washington’s unilateral withdrawal in 2018, now lack any legal or moral authority to invoke the clause. In a recent article published by The Cradle, the publication notes that public anger is mounting at the same time toward those who negotiated the deal, as they had assured that such a scenario could never occur.

France, Germany, and Britain (E3) initiated the snapback process on August 28, alleging that Iran violated the terms of the agreement. Tehran, however, insists that it was the Europeans who failed to honour their commitments under US pressure.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the move as “immoral, unjustified and unlawful,” adding that the European troika was “framing its reckless gambit as an endeavour to ‘advance diplomacy.’”

Under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, sanctions are automatically reinstated if any party claims Iran is in significant non-compliance. The mechanism cannot be vetoed—even by permanent UNSC members—meaning that China and Russia, Iran’s key strategic partners, have no legal means to block it.

The original UN sanctions included a strict arms embargo, restrictions on ballistic missile development, asset freezes targeting individuals and entities linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and a ban on the export of nuclear-related materials and technologies.

In July during talks in Istanbul, European parties proposed a deal to delay the snapback: renewed negotiations with the US, full access for UN inspectors to Iranian nuclear facilities, and the destruction of over 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.

The proposal, coming just weeks after Israeli-American attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, was reportedly dismissed by Tehran due to a lack of trust.

Two days before the snapback was triggered, both sides met in Geneva. Afterward, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi reiterated that Tehran “remains committed to diplomacy and a mutually beneficial diplomatic solution.” However, no breakthrough was reached then.

Iranian resistance to pressure

Officials in Tehran rest assured that the snapback will not heavily impact Iran’s oil or financial sectors.

Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said last week that the oil industry has expanded capacity by 127,000 barrels per day (bpd) and is capable of developing methods to market and sell oil under restrictive conditions, including UN sanctions.

Allaedin Boroujerdi, a veteran lawmaker and member of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, told The Cradle that current US and EU sanctions are “already far harsher” than pre-JCPOA UN measures, so the snapback “wouldn’t significantly change” Iran’s situation. 

“The real goal of the E3 move to trigger snapback is to create economic and psychological pressure inside Iran in order to destabilize society and weaken public resolve,” he said.

However, senior lawmaker and economist Mohsen Zangeneh noted that reinstating the six terminated resolutions is significant because they block financial cooperation and authorize inspections, controls, and even the seizure of Iranian ships and aircraft.

While acknowledging these measures have some impact, Zangeneh said that, given Iran’s experience under US sanctions, the new restrictions are unlikely to cripple trade or halt oil exports. “Iran has developed various strategies to neutralize the effects of sanctions and will continue its commercial activities,” he explained, while conceding that transaction costs will inevitably rise.

Psychological component greater than monetary damage

Hossein Samsami, a senior Iranian lawmaker and member of the economic commission, also points to the psychological aspect of these measures. 

“The psychological impact, particularly on currency markets, is immediate, as economic actors seize the moment to speculate. This effect outweighs the economic, which relates to military and nuclear restrictions. Since Iran is largely self-sufficient in these areas, the direct pressure from such sanctions remains limited.”

He warned, however, that the reinstated UN sanctions could reinforce existing US and EU measures, making them harder to bypass and raising import costs.

Snapback could spur Tehran to reconsider ties with West altogether

At the parliamentary level, a “triple-urgency” bill is under review that could authorize Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Additional Protocol, terminate negotiations with the US and E3, and end cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog.

West Asia analyst Reza Sadr al-Hosseini said Iran may respond by reducing IAEA cooperation, deploying more centrifuges, increasing enrichment, and possibly commercializing enriched material. He confirmed that NPT withdrawal is seriously being considered as one of several retaliatory options—a move that would signal Tehran’s readiness to escalate if pushed.

By Nazrin Sadigova