Exploring new South Korean leader’s measures for bringing peace to peninsula

Some analysts argue that former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s brief time in office was deeply damaging for inter-Korean relations. His successor, Lee Jae-myung, is now trying to lower tensions with North Korea by undoing parts of Yoon’s hardline agenda. Yet with Kim Jong-un showing no interest in diplomacy and strengthened by ties to Russia, many believe hopes for peace remain dim.

Aside from floating a vague initiative in August 2024 to form working-level groups aimed at expanding economic cooperation with Pyongyang, Yoon’s presidency was, as one National Interest article describes it, “Obama-esque: short on creative ideas and long on strategic patience.”

The article’s author recalls how Yoon dismantled reconciliation efforts by another former leader, President Moon Jae-in’s, while also suspending the 2018 military de-escalation agreement (despite the North withdrawing first), resuming loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts, and even entertained the idea of South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons.

Now, with Yoon out and Lee Jae-myung in power, the article contends that South Korea’s North Korea policy is entering a period of reformation. While Lee doesn’t appear as idealistic about unification as Moon was, he is clearly intent on moving away from Yoon-era hawkishness.

During his campaign, Lee proposed reviving the military hotline established during Moon’s presidency to ensure emergency communications between the Koreas. In his first week in office, Lee acted on his promises for détente, ordering the Unification Ministry to seek a ban on propaganda balloons launched by defectors and halting loudspeaker broadcasts across the border.

The goal is that small, low-risk moves like these might elicit goodwill from the North, helping to improve the overall atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula. It’s possible that Lee could even try to renegotiate mutual reentry into the 2018 military pact, which had separated the forces, restricted drills near the DMZ, and opened military-to-military communication lines.

The US factor

However, like all presidents before him, Lee faces a fundamental limitation: he controls only part of the equation. The oft-cited phrase “it takes two to tango” doesn’t quite fit the Korean Peninsula — it usually takes three: South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. While Seoul might want to return to the era of 2018–2019 summits, handshakes, and agreements, the other parties are far less predictable.

Donald Trump, for one, has signaled some nostalgia for those years. He often speaks about his rapport with Kim Jong-un and sees merit in keeping friendly ties with a nuclear-armed leader. In fact, he has taken action. According to NK News, Trump’s administration reportedly attempted to send Kim a letter through the UN mission.

Still, North Korea is just one of many issues on Trump’s agenda — and not the highest priority. It’s not far-fetched to think that the North Korea nuclear issue might be shelved for a future administration. But the key player remains Kim Jong-un. If he doesn’t want renewed diplomacy, there’s little that Lee or Trump can do to meaningfully shift the dynamic.

The incentives that once nudged Kim toward engagement — present in 2018 and 2019 — appear to be gone in 2025, the article explains, for three main reasons:

First, Kim now enjoys Russia’s backing and no longer fears new UN Security Council sanctions.

Second, US sanctions relief is less essential to Pyongyang now than it was during Trump’s first term.

Third, Kim has no desire to repeat the humiliation of the failed Hanoi summit in 2019, where he left without a deal or diplomatic win.

Unless Kim’s calculations change on any of those points, the article argues that Lee Jae-myung’s best option is to make incremental moves toward reducing hostility and hope that, eventually, Pyongyang responds in kind.

By Nazrin Sadigova