Four years on: Why Moscow waits and Kyiv endures Op-ed by Politico

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has settled into a grinding stalemate defined less by sweeping offensives than by attrition, exhaustion and political calculation. In an opinion column for POLITICO Europe, Jamie Dettmer draws an unlikely literary parallel to frame this moment: the shared belief of Charles Dickens’ Wilkins Micawber and Russian President Vladimir Putin that “something will turn up.”

Dettmer argues that, militarily, the Kremlin faces a war that looks unwinnable in conventional terms. Russian forces have paid what he describes as a “colossal price in lives lost and bodies maimed,” yet have failed to seize the entirety of Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Before the February 2022 invasion, Russia controlled roughly 7 per cent of Ukrainian territory. A month into the war, that figure rose to about 27 per cent. Since then, however, it has stabilised at around 18 to 19 per cent, according to Harvard’s Belfer Center, as cited in the column.

Although Russian troops have advanced incrementally — Dettmer notes the seizure of some 4,700 square kilometres over the past year — breakthroughs have not translated into decisive strategic gains. Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War, referenced in the piece, point to Ukraine’s fortified defensive belt in western Donetsk as a barrier Russian forces have been unable to rupture. In Zaporizhzhia, Russian units have even been pushed back.

Localised offensives near Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka exposed moments of Ukrainian vulnerability, particularly when Kyiv’s forces were tactically overstretched. Yet, Dettmer writes, Russia has struggled to exploit such openings due to manpower and materiel shortages, as well as the risk of devastating Ukrainian drone strikes. Advances toward Kupyansk and efforts to push Ukrainian troops farther from Russia’s Belgorod region have similarly stalled.

Why persist under such constraints? Dettmer suggests that Putin must demonstrate a tangible victory to justify the war’s immense costs and manage the risks inherent in unwinding a war-driven economy. He cites Russian analyst Ella Paneyakh, who warns of political dangers tied to demobilisation, including how to reintegrate veterans and rebalance economic winners and losers.

Here, Dettmer invokes what he dubs the “Micawber Principle.” Despite strains, exiled Russian journalist Dmitri Kuznets argues that “for now, the Russian military machine — reassembled following the defeats of 2022 — is functioning decently: The authorities are able to cover current losses in personnel and equipment.” However, Kuznets adds, “there is no capacity to significantly increase the volume of resources being deployed.”

The column emphasises that Ukraine faces an even steeper manpower dilemma. Ukraine’s new defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, disclosed that around two million citizens are wanted for military registration violations.

In November, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported 310,000 criminal cases related to unauthorised absences and desertion, most occurring in 2025. According to a study by the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies, the armed forces’ manpower shortages stem from “institutional weakness and corruption, social fatigue and mental exhaustion, deficiencies in military training and leadership, demographic and economic constraints, and the impact of Russian propaganda.”

While Western commentary often focuses on the “missile math” — the imbalance in missile and air defence stocks — Dettmer contends that the “manpower math” may be more consequential. As Ukraine’s commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskiy described during the battle for Pokrovsk, Russian forces employed “total infiltration” tactics, exploiting thin Ukrainian lines with small infantry units.

Dettmer also highlights growing unease within Ukraine. Some opposition politicians warn that mobilization fatigue is compounded by perceptions that the West is prepared to fight “to the last Ukrainian.”

That phrase, he writes, is increasingly heard in conversations with ordinary citizens, accompanied by resentment over reduced U.S. military donations and objections within the European Union, including from Hungary, to large-scale financial packages.

Former President Petro Poroshenko, speaking to POLITICO on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, cautioned that negotiations involving territorial concessions could destabilise Ukraine internally. Any deal would likely require a referendum, and opposition in parliament would be fierce.

“I don’t see the parliament ever passing anything like that,” opposition lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova said. “It would be seen as a capitulation.”

In Dettmer’s assessment, Putin may be trapped in a dilemma: unable to conquer Ukraine outright, yet unwilling to concede failure. Ukraine, meanwhile, cannot realistically reclaim all lost territory by force but must endure, hoping that over time Russia’s resolve weakens and negotiations become unavoidable. Until then, both sides appear locked in a war neither can decisively win — each waiting, in its own way, for something to turn up.

By Sabina Mammadli