Friends in the sand: Why Syria’s Sharaa and UAE need each other

In a sharp analysis published by Responsible Statecraft, the strategic motivations behind Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s April 13 visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are laid bare. The article illustrates how Damascus and Abu Dhabi, once awkward partners in authoritarian solidarity under Bashar al-Assad, are now recalibrating their relationship amid shifting regional power dynamics—and mutual needs.

Syria’s post-Assad government, led by the HTS-aligned Sharaa, is seeking legitimacy and economic lifelines. Its outreach to the UAE follows a similar visit to Saudi Arabia, showing Damascus’s intent to win over powerful Gulf actors despite their historical opposition to Islamist movements like HTS. The UAE, a staunch opponent of political Islam, had supported Assad precisely because he stood as a bulwark against revolution and groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. That regime’s collapse in December 2024 was a major ideological blow to Abu Dhabi.

Yet, rather than isolating Syria’s new rulers, the UAE is taking a pragmatic approach. By engaging with Sharaa and his foreign minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, Emirati leaders are hedging against instability and seeking influence in a rapidly evolving Levant. For the UAE, keeping lines of communication open could limit HTS’s reach, shape Damascus’s foreign policy trajectory, and prevent Syria from drifting into the orbit of rivals like Türkiye or Qatar.

On the Syrian side, Sharaa is playing his cards with caution and calculation. With sanctions still strangling the Syrian economy, particularly under the Caesar Act, Sharaa sees in Abu Dhabi a potential conduit to Washington and Europe. The UAE’s global connections, especially its ties with former U.S. President Donald Trump and European policymakers, are viewed as potential pressure points for easing economic restrictions. Still, experts quoted in the article, including Mira Hussein of the Alwaleed Centre, remain sceptical that Abu Dhabi will fully champion Syria’s cause in Western capitals. Ideological distrust lingers beneath the surface.

At the same time, the UAE’s ties with Israel add another layer of complexity. Damascus likely raised concerns over Israeli airstrikes and incursions into Syrian territory during the visit. While analyst Merissa Khurma sees the UAE as a useful go-between due to its normalised relations with Tel Aviv, others doubt the Emiratis have the leverage—or the will—to pressure Israel on Syria’s behalf.

The article closes by placing the visit within Sharaa’s broader foreign policy of non-alignment. Unlike Assad, who deeply tied Syria to Iran, Sharaa appears to be spreading his bets—courting the Gulf, Türkiye, the EU, and Russia simultaneously. His stop in Abu Dhabi, analysts say, is part of a “zero problems” doctrine aimed at securing reconstruction funds and avoiding the mistakes of his predecessor.

In short, Responsible Statecraft argues, the UAE and Syria are engaging not out of affinity, but necessity. For Abu Dhabi, it’s about managing threats. For Sharaa, it’s about surviving them.

By Vugar Khalilov