Gen Z’s global reckoning: Youth bulges, digital anger, political volatility

As Financial Times analysis shows, the world’s youngest generation is no longer a demographic footnote. From Africa to advanced economies, Gen Z’s economic frustration, digital fluency and political impatience are reshaping power — with unpredictable and sometimes dangerous consequences.

The succession of youth-led protests that erupted across continents over the past year marks a decisive moment for global politics. From Bangladesh to Madagascar, governments have fallen or been shaken by demonstrations driven largely by young people demanding accountability, jobs and dignity. As the Financial Times argues, this is not merely a protest cycle but a structural shift: Gen Z, born between 1997 and 2012, is moving “decisively to the political centre stage”.

Demography is central to the story. According to Our World in Data, cited by the FT, around 80 countries with a combined population of 2.5 billion have a median age of 29 or below, making them “Gen Z-dominant countries”. Most are in Africa, where Uganda’s median age is 16 and Niger’s 15, but they also include states such as Ecuador, Uzbekistan and the Philippines. Only four African countries exceed the 29-year threshold. The implication, as the FT stresses, is stark: “the younger the population the greater the potential for popular backlash”.

Academic research supports this linkage. A 2006 study by Henrik Urdal found that countries experiencing “youth bulges” are more prone to political violence, especially where institutions are weak and employment scarce. The FT is careful not to overstate generational determinism. Protests in Iran and Morocco, with median ages above 30, show that youthful unrest does not disappear once a demographic line is crossed. Still, demography magnifies pressure when economic frustration collides with political exclusion.

What distinguishes Gen Z from previous cohorts is its digital nativity. As the FT notes, this generation has “unprecedented access to information”, including exposure to elite lifestyles and opportunities elsewhere. This contrast sharpens resentment. In Kenya in 2024, Gen Z protesters forced President William Ruto to reverse tax rises and dismiss his cabinet. Cartoonist Patrick Gathara described it as “a revolt against the political class”, adding that Ruto “has incited a change in Kenyan politics he can’t control”.

Yet the political direction of Gen Z anger is far from straightforward. Afrobarometer data cited by the FT shows strong African support for democracy: two-thirds prefer it, while 80 per cent reject one-man rule.

Still, disappointment with “fake or woefully underperforming democracies” has led some young people to tolerate — or even welcome — military or strongman rule. Madagascar’s youth protests succeeded only with armed forces backing, while in Tanzania, demonstrations against “sham elections” were met with brutal repression before Samia Suluhu Hassan claimed victory with “98 per cent of the vote”.

Even in ageing, wealthy societies, Gen Z frustration over housing costs, student debt and AI-driven job insecurity is pushing some towards political extremes. This makes the generation, in the paper’s words, “a potentially disruptive force” not only where institutions are fragile, but also where they are strongest — and have the most to lose.

The risk for governments everywhere is mistaking youthful anger for a passing phase, rather than recognising it as a defining political force of the coming decades.

By Sabina Mammadli