How Türkiye won Syria's Civil War Foreign Affair’s breakdown of Ankara’s policies

While the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has sparked anxiety across the Middle East, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees opportunity in a post-Assad future. An article by the Foreign Affairs magazine breaks down how Türkiye’s policies in Syria over the last decades made way for them possibly becoming the ultimate beneficiary of the protracted civil war.

The Turkish government views the exit of Syria’s longstanding former ruler, Bashar al-Assad as a chance to leverage the country’s longstanding friendly ties with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Sunni Islamist group that is now dominant in Damascus. Despite its designation as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Türkiye has indirectly supported HTS over the years by shielding it from Syrian government attacks, managing aid flows to its territories, and enabling trade across the border, thereby strengthening its influence over the group.

According to the analysis by the magazine, Erdogan has long used this influence to shape rebel actions, such as quashing plans for an Aleppo offensive in October. With Assad’s regional allies weakened by conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, Erdogan seized the chance to pressure Assad into addressing Ankara’s concerns, including the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees that have been living in Türkiye since the conflict broke out, a critical domestic issue for the Turkish president’s government.

Assad’s unexpected exit leaves Türkiye well-positioned. A friendly government in Damascus could ease refugee returns, bolster Ankara’s influence in the region and form a valuable leverage in the country’s relations with other key players, such as Russia, Iran and the U.S. While risks remain, Erdogan’s strategic investments in the Syrian opposition could make Türkiye the ultimate beneficiary of Syria’s protracted civil war.

The article recalls, however, that Erdogan’s path to influence in Syria has been fraught with challenges. From the beginning, Ankara supported anti-Assad rebel groups financially and militarily after the uprising in 2011. However, the prolonged Syrian civil war strained Türkiye’s relations with regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as Assad's allies, Iran and Russia. Ankara’s ties with the United States also deteriorated after the U.S. began arming the Syrian Kurdish YPG in 2014—a group Türkiye considers a terrorist organization. Feeling betrayed, Erdogan turned to cooperation with Russia, which had intervened in Syria in 2015 to support Assad.

The author believes that Moscow’s dominance forced Erdogan to collaborate with Putin, including securing Russia’s approval for Türkiye’s 2019 incursion into northern Syria to counter Kurdish advances. This military action was critical for Erdogan to maintain his domestic alliance with Turkish nationalists.

With Assad now ousted, this power balance has now drastically shifted in Türkiye’s favor. Russia’s loss in Syria weakens its regional influence, giving Ankara more leeway while also undermining Iranian influence. Ankara and Tehran have long been regional rivals, particularly as Iranian-backed forces previously sidelined Turkish-supported factions. The dynamics in the South Caucasus have been further deepening these two players’ rivalry as they have pursued conflicting agendas, with Türkiye tightening its cooperation with Azerbaijan in ways that Iran sees as a threat, while Tehran maintains friendly ties with Armenia, which in turn has contentious relationships with both Türkiye and Azerbaijan. 

Assad’s collapse also opens opportunities for U.S.-Türkiye reconciliation. Erdogan could leverage this moment to secure a U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, particularly under a Trump administration seeking to exit the conflict. In return, Türkiye might pledge to contain ISIS, setting the stage for a renewed U.S.-Türkiye partnership.

By Nazrin Sadigova