Hungary’s Russian oil reliance: necessity or political choice?

Hungary’s dependence on Russian crude oil has once again come under scrutiny after damage to the Druzhba pipeline—one of the world’s longest oil conduits—halted deliveries to Budapest and threatened a billion-dollar loan to Ukraine.

While Hungarian officials insist the country has no alternative, analysts cited by Euronews argue that this reliance reflects a mixture of political and economic decisions rather than purely technical necessity.

Ukrainian authorities say the pipeline damage was caused by a Russian strike, complicating repairs, as engineers can work only during daylight due to nightly air raids. Meanwhile, Hungary has accused Kyiv of sabotage and delaying restoration efforts. The European Commission has proposed a formal inspection and fact-finding mission to investigate the incident.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long insisted that Russian crude is essential for national energy security, arguing that switching to alternative supplies would raise costs and reduce efficiency. However, experts suggest the reality is more complex.

According to the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Hungary remains highly reliant on Russian oil despite having access to alternative routes.

“While Hungary remains highly reliant on Russian oil, it has ignored warnings to diversify where it gets its energy, has access to viable alternative routes, and continuing to purchase Russian crude has not translated to lower domestic fuel prices for Hungarians on the ground,” the CSD noted in an analysis reviewed by Euronews’ fact-checking team, The Cube.

Hungary’s dependence is stark: by 2025, Russian crude accounted for around 90% of the country’s imports, one of the highest levels in the EU. This contrasts sharply with many other European nations, which have gradually reduced reliance on Russian oil since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Hungary’s primary oil operator, MOL, which supplies both Hungary and Slovakia, remains the last major EU buyer of Russian crude. Between 2021 and 2025, the country’s share of Russian imports reportedly increased from 61% to 93%, despite EU-wide diversification efforts.

So what alternatives exist? The European Commission cites the Adria pipeline, operated by Croatian state-owned Jadranski naftovod (JANAF), which links the Omišalj Terminal on Croatia’s Krk island to refineries in Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia.

The CSD highlights that transit fees for non-Russian crude via the Adria line are lower than for Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline (€12 per tonne vs €21 per tonne). JANAF insists the pipeline has the capacity to transport 14–15 million tonnes annually, enough to meet Hungary’s needs.

“All capacity tests of JANAF's pipeline system… were carried out in the presence of MOL representatives,” a spokesperson said. “The first two tests confirmed that JANAF's pipeline can meet MOL's full crude oil requirements. MOL has used its network for over a decade and is fully familiar with the capabilities of the pipeline.”

Hungary and MOL dispute this assessment. Officials claim that the Adria pipeline has not reliably delivered sufficient volumes, with actual flows closer to 2 million tonnes annually. MOL also argues that Russian crude is cheaper: in 2024, Hungary paid an average of €471 per tonne, compared with €564 per tonne for non-Russian alternatives, a 20% discount.

Orbán’s spokesperson, Zoltán Kovács, stressed that “Hungarian refineries are fundamentally designed to process crude oil from Russian sources,” particularly Russian Urals Crude.

Analysts argue, however, that technical limitations are not absolute. MOL has processed non-Russian crude during past disruptions, including a 2019 Druzhba outage, and refineries have been upgraded to increase flexibility.

Ben McWilliams, energy analyst at the Bruegel think tank, told The Cube: “Hungary's dependence is driven by commercial interests and not hard technical constraints. It is fully feasible for both countries to end Russian crude oil imports.”

The economic implications are significant. Despite discounted Russian oil, domestic fuel prices remain high.

In 2024, pre-tax petrol was 18% more expensive in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, and diesel prices were 10% higher. CSD notes that neighboring countries phasing out Russian oil faced no major disruptions and now enjoy some of the EU’s lowest fuel prices, while MOL’s profits have grown by selling fuel at regional market prices.

Kovács defended Budapest’s position: “In recent years, Hungarian families and businesses have been able to purchase fuel at prices in line with the regional average. The government will continue to do everything in its power to ensure a secure and affordable supply for families.”

By Sabina Mammadli