Inside year that tested rules guiding US military Op-ed by Bulwark
Every administration leaves fingerprints on the US military. But the past year stands apart. As retired US Army Europe Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling argues in a Bulwark opinion piece, this period will be remembered less for strategy than for the steady erosion of the professional, legal, and ethical guardrails that have long protected America’s armed forces.
Before this administration took office, Hertling warned that the job of secretary of defence demands more than conviction or battlefield experience. It requires institutional fluency and an understanding of how law, strategy, alliances, and civil-military norms intersect. The world does not pause for inexperience, and the office cannot compensate for it. Nearly a year into Secretary Pete Hegseth’s tenure, those concerns are no longer theoretical.
What has emerged, Hertling contends, is not a single scandal but a pattern: behaviour once considered out of bounds has become normalised. The Department of Defence’s energy has been consumed by issues peripheral to the military’s core challenges, while long-standing norms that made the force effective have been weakened or ignored.
Central to this breakdown is the chain of command. Effective secretaries of defence invite candid military and legal advice and expect disagreement as a safeguard, not a threat.
Yet the early dismissal or sidelining of senior officers, often without clear explanation, sent a chilling message across the force. Historically, such actions were rare and carefully justified. Without transparency, officers cannot discern whether firings stem from incompetence, disagreement, or politics. The result is predictable, the op-ed states: silence replaces candor, and risk aversion supplants professional judgment.
Operationally, Hertling notes a troubling pattern of “activity without an objective.” US forces have been employed episodically across theaters without clear strategic aims or legal frameworks. Military power has increasingly been used to address problems once handled by diplomacy or law enforcement.
Labelling fentanyl a “weapon of mass destruction,” followed by lethal action against traffickers abroad, marks a profound shift in how force is justified. Likewise, rhetoric about domestic deployments for “law and order” strains civil-military norms when governors and courts object. These guardrails exist to preserve legitimacy; once eroded, they are difficult to rebuild, the piece points out.
Equally damaging is the attack on legal guidelines. Emphasising speed and lethality while downplaying rules of engagement misunderstands how professionals operate. Legal frameworks are not obstacles; they enable discipline, predictability, and legitimacy. As Hertling bluntly reminds readers, law is “what separates a professional fighting force from a gang of thugs.”
Strategic confusion compounds these problems. The 2025 National Security Strategy signals major shifts in alliances and force posture without the coordination that typically precedes such change. Allies, particularly in Europe, see inconsistency—not debate—as the real danger. Persistent talk of withdrawals or alliance obligations, without consultation, looks less like efficiency and more like decoupling.
Perhaps most consequential is where leadership attention has gone. While the force grapples with recruiting shortfalls, aging platforms, and industrial fragility, disproportionate focus has been placed on symbolic culture wars. Culture, Hertling argues, is built on trust and competence, not slogans.
The gravest risk is normalisation: the quiet acceptance that standards are optional. As Hertling warns in The Bulwark, unless these guardrails are deliberately rebuilt, the damage will outlast any single year—and the military’s professionalism itself may be at stake.
By Sabina Mammadli







