ISW: Kremlin looking for scapegoat to blame for Russia's military failures

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian MoD may use Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as a scapegoat for the costly drive on Bakhmut once the offensive culminates.

ISW assessed on February 5 that Putin relies on a group of scapegoats to publicly take risks in his place and shoulder the blame for Russian military failures and unpopular policies. Putin will likely use Wagner’s high casualties, reports about poor morale, and war crimes to deflect from likely equal or possibly worse problems within the Russian Armed Forces, Caliber.Az reports, citing the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

"Much of the Russian and Western coverage of Bakhmut already focuses mainly on heavy Wagner losses, allowing the MoD to cover up or downplay other losses suffered by Russian conventional forces. The revelation of high losses among Wagner convicts and mercenaries would not cause as much societal outrage as ongoing reports of casualties and mistreatment of involuntarily mobilised servicemen," ISW reports.

The report cites unnamed Kremlin officials as saying that "Putin has been increasingly tightening his inner circle and is unlikely to offer the benefits Prigozhin once had regardless of the severity of the Russian military failures on the frontlines. The Russian MoD still apparently retains favour with Putin despite devastating military failures around Vuhledar in early February".

ISW notes that Prigozhin's fall from grace will likely scare other Kremlin officials such as Ramzan Kadyrov into scaling down their ambitions to avoid experiencing Prigozhin’s fate.

"Putin has likely not decided yet whether he will spare Prigozhin, and Wagner’s fate likely depends on Prigozhin’s ability to convince the Kremlin of his loyalty. Prigozhin is also unlikely to reach his previous heights regardless of his renewed efforts to recruit mercenaries from 42 different cities in Russia. Prigozhin had earned a bad reputation for the treatment of his forces as cannon fodder and had drained ultranationalist communities of recruits. Prigozhin’s public pleas for ammunition and supplies are also unlikely to make service with Wagner attractive to recruits." the report adds.

The conflict between the Russian MoD and Wagner shows that different parties in Putin’s inner circle are competing with one another in potentially zero-sum games that do not further Putin’s overall objectives.

"The Russian MoD is currently prioritising eliminating Wagner on the battlefields in Bakhmut, which is likely slowing down the rate of advance in the area. Prigozhin saw Bakhmut as an opportunity to gain leverage on the Russian MoD and likely in the Kremlin in pursuit of his own commercial and political aspirations. Putin used Wagner to protect his regime from detrimental societal ramifications of mobilisation, which also continues to inhibit his war efforts in Ukraine," he said.

Key inflections

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 12 that ISW’s March 11 report about her comments acknowledging Kremlin infighting is false and an “informational attack”. ISW used accounts from Russian media sources as well as a Russian military blogger (who claimed to be in attendance) to report on Zakharova’s comments in an altercation with information space entrepreneur Igor Ashmanov during a panel discussion in Moscow. A military blogger who attended the event quoted Zakharova as saying that Kremlin cannot replicate the Stalinist approach of establishing a modern equivalent to the Soviet Information Bureau to centrally control Russia’s internal information space due to infighting among unspecified Kremlin “elites”. The military blogger did not comment on Zakharova’s denial on March 12 but amplified a social media post from another military blogger who claimed that the West (presumably ISW) misrepresented Zakharova’s statements. The social media post, however, also blamed Zakharova and the Kremlin for failing to adopt stronger information space policies. Several other military bloggers confirmed that Ashmanov accused Kremlin organs of failing to create a trusted centralized information campaign but argued about how other attendees attempted to downplay his statements. This military blogger discourse not only confirms that the incident occurred, but also that ultranationalist figures reiterated variants of ISW’s assessment that the Kremlin’s ability to control the Russian information space is diminishing.

Iranian State Media announced on March 11 that Iran has finalized a deal to buy Sukhoi-35 fighter jets from Russia.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut but have not completed a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement around the city. Russian military bloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters captured parts or all of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), although Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that Wagner fighters do not control the settlement.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Avdiivka and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City. Russian military bloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.

A Russian military blogger claimed on March 12 that there is a high desertion rate among SPETSNAZ  forces. The Russian military blogger claimed that no SPETSNAZ units are at their full complement and that some SPETSNAZ commanders have fled their units despite having received generous salaries for the past ten years. ISW has no independent confirmation of these assertions.  It appears unlikely that most commanders have fled these elite units.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) reported on March 12 that Russian military personnel from eastern regions of Russia die in Ukraine at per capita rates up to fortyfold of those of Russian personnel from Moscow city. The UK MoD reported that Kazakh and Tartar minorities make up 75 per cent of casualties among Russian military personnel from Astrakhan Oblast.

Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on March 12 that Russian officials have illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia. Vereshchuk also stated that the total number of children deported to Russia may be approximately 150,000.