NATO’s Arctic drone gap is widening while Russia is moving fast

As Russia accelerates the militarisation of the High North, NATO faces a stark warning: close the drone gap now, or risk strategic disadvantage in one of the world’s most unforgiving theaters.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has re-centered the Arctic in global security calculations. Once viewed as a peripheral arena in the post–Cold War order, the High North is again a zone of high-intensity competition. While the United States and NATO’s Arctic allies debate force posture and modernisation priorities, Moscow is moving with greater speed and coherence in one decisive area — uncrewed systems, Defense News reveals.

A widening gap has emerged between NATO’s ambition to defend the region and its ability to deploy Arctic-capable drones at scale. The future balance of power in the High North will depend not only on submarines, fighter aircraft and icebreakers, but on the capacity to field, sustain and counter uncrewed systems in extreme conditions and unprecedented numbers.

Russia enters this competition with structural advantages. It operates the world’s largest industrial-scale drone ecosystem outside China and is rapidly institutionalising lessons learned in Ukraine. Moscow has created a dedicated branch for uncrewed systems, expanded mass training for operators and established new drone units across its armed forces, including within the Northern Fleet.

Annual drone production exceeds 1.5 million units, with Western intelligence assessments projecting further growth, aided by Chinese industrial inputs and sanctions evasion.

In the Arctic, drones are likely to function as integrated force multipliers. They can provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance along Arctic littorals and the Northern Sea Route, support Bastion coastal defence systems, enhance anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, and conduct long-range strikes using one-way attack drones in tandem with traditional missiles. These operations would be paired with cyber and electronic warfare designed to disrupt allied sensing and command-and-control systems.

For NATO, uncrewed systems may matter more in the Arctic than in any other theater. Vast distances, sparse infrastructure and extreme weather limit sustained human presence and create persistent gaps in situational awareness. Traditional crewed platforms remain indispensable but are few in number and expensive to maintain. Even with renewed investment, they cannot alone provide the surveillance, logistics and targeting density envisioned in NATO’s regional defence plans.

Drones offer persistence, scalability and operational flexibility at lower cost and risk. They can conduct reconnaissance, resupply missions, casualty evacuation, mine countermeasures and strike operations. As Defense News notes, “uncrewed systems are no longer niche enablers but indispensable elements for strengthening deterrence and defense in the Arctic.”

Yet technology alone is insufficient. Many NATO systems are not built for Arctic conditions. Extreme cold degrades batteries, icing disrupts sensors and propulsion, satellite coverage above 75 degrees north is limited, and corrosion accelerates wear. Infrastructure constraints further complicate sustainment, making autonomous navigation and resilient communications essential — but more complex and costly.

Institutional shortcomings compound these technical barriers. NATO doctrine still treats drones largely as supplements rather than core elements of deterrence. Commanders lack mature concepts for integrating uncrewed systems into multidomain operations against a drone-enabled adversary. Personnel shortages — particularly among skilled operators and maintainers — further slow adaptation.

Meanwhile, innovation across the alliance remains fragmented. Scaling successful experiments into deployable capability has proven difficult. As Defense News argues, procurement reform is essential to prioritise speed, interoperability and scale over industrial protectionism.

The strategic imperative is clear: NATO must field Arctic-ready, modular and interoperable systems; strengthen resilient command networks; invest in personnel and sustainment; and procure collectively at scale. As the analysis concludes, “Effective Arctic defence requires a balanced high–low mix in which uncrewed systems extend and multiply the effectiveness of traditional forces rather than substitute for them.”

In the High North, time and technology are converging. The alliance’s response will determine whether deterrence holds.

By Sabina Mammadli