Setting up checkpoints in Zangazur and Lachin: How will Azerbaijan benefit? Summing up President Aliyev's speech in Munich

One of the key statements of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the Munich Security Conference was that checkpoints should be established at both ends of the Zangazur corridor.

Can we consider that the idea of an extraterritorial Zangazur corridor is no longer on Azerbaijan's agenda? There is a possibility that extraterritoriality is still important to us, but Azerbaijan has decided to tone down its involvement in this foreign-policy toxic issues [of corridor extraterritoriality] for Baku. If Russia needs an extraterritorial corridor, it should resolve the issue with the Armenians themselves, but not at the expense of Azerbaijan. As Caliber.Az has noted many times in its articles, it is important for Azerbaijan to be a beneficiary of regional processes, rather than a tool of them.

We will soon learn from the reactions of Zakharova and other "talking heads" whether Moscow will react drastically to the checkpoint issue. There are two issues here at once: the presence of Armenian checkpoints in the corridor through which its goods will go to Türkiye; and the presence of the Azerbaijani checkpoint on the Lachin road, which will enable Baku to block much more effectively the funding of the illegal regime in Khankendi, and thus carry out the accelerated integration of the remaining part into the Azerbaijani state.

As we all understand, in both cases - Zangazur and Lachin - Russia is not interested in having Armenian and Azerbaijani checkpoints respectively, as this weakens Russian control in the region. However, if Baku and Yerevan agree with each other on the subject of the checkpoints, Russia will eventually be forced to accept the decision of the two sides. It is no coincidence that the talks about the checkpoint are conducted precisely on the American-European negotiating track.

A possible "dismissal" of Ruben Vardanyan by Araik Harutyunyan (on instructions from Yerevan) will be a touchstone of progress. If it happens, it means that Aliyev and Pashinyan were able to achieve some real progress in Munich. In this case, Baku will solve the Vardanyan issue with Yerevan's hands, without using force and without confronting Russia. The logic of the negotiations and the messages voiced by Ilham Aliyev suggest that if Vardanyan is not removed from Karabakh, the military option will again become a priority for Baku. It is not a question of "impulse", but of national security - the "Ruben Vardanyan project" is a time bomb under Azerbaijan's sovereignty for generations to come. By the way, Ruben's media activity has virtually come to naught. Nothing is heard from him except tweets; his handlers assigned him not to escalate the situation. But it is crucial for Azerbaijan to remove him from our territory. It will be a symbolic precedent. If a military operation is carried out in Karabakh, the West will treat it with restraint, even despite the activity of the Armenian diaspora.

For Armenia, the issue of mutual checkpoints is strategically beneficial (the Karabakh Armenians, who have turned into a "suitcase without a handle", are dumped, and the issue of the Zangazur corridor is diplomatically resolved, after which the prospect of opening communications with Azerbaijan and Türkiye becomes real). But it will not be easy for Yerevan now, as internal and external pressures will intensify.

One of the key Armenian narratives so far has been "Azerbaijani aggression" and its desire to "cut through the corridor by force". After Aliyev's words about the checkpoint, this Armenian argument loses force. Azerbaijan publicly, in the presence of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, sent a "constructive signal". In return, Armenia was offered to set up a checkpoint on the border with the Lachin region of Azerbaijan. Now it's the Armenian turn to make a step. If Armenia insists that the Lachin road must be controlled by the Russian army, and the Azerbaijani checkpoint should not be there, this position is unlikely to be understood by the US State Department. There will almost certainly be more Russian pressure on Yerevan in the near future (new gas pipeline accidents, traffic jams on Upper Lars and other random "surprises" cannot be ruled out). The main thing here is for Pashinyan to withstand the pressure and not to backtrack, as he has done many times in the past.

There is still no clarity on the route of the Zangazur corridor. This is a matter of principle for Baku, and if Armenia continues to offer long and inconvenient routes, we should not expect unblocking of regional communications.

As for the identity of the customs-legal regime in the Zangazur corridor and Lachin route: the difference is that in the case of the Zangazur corridor Armenia can claim only for transit fees, and in the case of using the Lachin route the customs fees should be added here as well.

The most important thing is what will happen if Nikol Pashinyan refuses Azerbaijan's proposal to establish a checkpoint. Baku will interpret it as Yerevan's non-recognition of Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, as Nikol Pashinyan's continuation of his "miatsum" policy, as well as Yerevan's complete rejection of the Prague agreements. In other words, it will become another "Artsakh is Armenia and that's it".