Singapore reinforces "poisonous shrimp" nickname by boosting submarine fleet

Amid rising regional tensions and global concerns over weakening security alliances, Southeast Asia’s so-called “poisonous shrimp,” Singapore, is arming itself with more venom.

In a move reminiscent of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s Cold War-era policy of strategic self-reliance, the city-state ordered two additional tactical submarines earlier this year.

This will increase its underwater fleet by 50%, giving Singapore six submarines—comparable to or exceeding those operated by far larger neighbours like Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. According to an article by Nikkei Asia, the acquisition is part of a broader military buildup.

Singapore’s Defence Ministry has allocated SG$23.4 billion (approx. $18.2 billion) for the current fiscal year—a 12% jump from the previous year—aiming to resume projects delayed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Officials anticipate military spending will remain around 3% of GDP over the next ten years.

The nickname “poisonous shrimp” is in reference to a small state with an outsized capacity to defend itself against larger powers. Through robust defence spending and careful diplomacy with global heavyweights, the International Policy Digest points out that it has carved out a position of strategic influence.

Its ability to convert civilian infrastructure for military purposes in times of crisis highlights its long-term security planning. Positioned at a vital maritime crossroads, Singapore has emerged as a confident guardian of key trade routes.

By maintaining close military ties with the United States while deepening economic relations with China, the city-state mirrors a contemporary Sparta—disciplined, pragmatic, and resilient.

Though Singapore has never been engaged in war as a sovereign nation and avoids naming potential adversaries, it has stated that the submarines are tailored for the shallow, crowded waters surrounding the island.

Officials remain alert to nearby hotspots, such as the recent flare-up between Thailand and Cambodia, ongoing India-Pakistan tensions, and deteriorating US-China relations—all of which pose indirect risks to Singapore as a key Asian trade and financial hub.

With a population of 6 million and a military force boosted by two years of mandatory national service for men, Singapore may not be able to shift regional power dynamics alone. Yet it actively promotes dialogue through initiatives like the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit, while continuing to strengthen its own defence posture.

“Singapore lacks strategic depth, which is why our defence policy has always been proactive,” said Graham Ong-Webb, adjunct fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, in an interview with Nikkei Asia. “That includes planning ahead, investing early, and never taking peace for granted.”

This defence strategy, rooted in the dual pillars of “deterrence and diplomacy,” aims both to signal consequences for any would-be aggressors and to promote peaceful conflict resolution. However, Singaporean officials acknowledge that the global shift toward nationalism—exemplified by Donald Trump’s second-term “America First” agenda—could make this approach harder to sustain.

“These trends present real challenges for a small state like Singapore, which has long depended on a network of international partners to uphold security and stability,” said Nicholas Fang, senior adviser at The Asia Group, speaking to Nikkei Asia. “Encouraging cooperation and dialogue becomes more difficult in such an environment.”

If diplomacy fails and the regional security environment deteriorates, observers say Singapore aims to ensure it does not have to depend on outside powers for defence. That imperative drives its ongoing investment in modernising its armed forces and maintaining credible deterrence.

By Nazrin Sadigova